Mind the gaps: Mapping and mitigating exclusionary data bias in crisis informatics by Samuels, Rachel
MIND THE GAPS: MAPPING AND MITIGATING 


























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in the 












COPYRIGHT © 2020 BY RACHEL SAMUELS 
 
MIND THE GAPS: MAPPING AND MITIGATING 


























Dr. John E. Taylor, Advisor 
School of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Qi Ryan Wang 






Dr. Emily Grubert 
School of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Michael Elliott 
School of City & Regional Planning and 
Public Policy  




Dr. Iris Tien 
School of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  
   








For Paul, without whom I never would have walked this path. Thank you for showing 






This has been a long journey, and I have been exceedingly fortunate to have had so 
many people help me along the way. Although an exhaustive list would likely be longer 
than the remainder of this dissertation, I would like to thank a few individuals without 
whom this would not have been possible. 
First, thank you to my advisor and committee chair, Dr. John Taylor. Thank you 
for taking a chance on a complete stranger on Visiting Students’ Day (jinx!), on a new 
student struggling to adapt to a brand new field, and on each of the wild ideas I have 
presented to you thus far. I appreciate your continued understanding, patience, and support 
as I stumbled around in the dark, trying to judge the worth of my ideas by their weight and 
shape. As I look towards my next steps, I am grateful to you and the lab for continually 
pushing and challenging me to do and be better. 
Thank you to my committee members for their guidance and genuine desire to 
transform my research. Dr. Elliott, thank you for your perspective on how to use the 
histories and scars of cities to inform my analyses. Dr. Grubert, thank you for your 
kindness, your insight, and your honesty in improving the broader implications and 
applications of my work. Dr. Tien, thank you for your unparalleled teachings on data bias 
and the methods we can use to interrogate it. Dr. Wang, thank you for laying the 
foundations in the Network Dynamics Lab for studying disasters and for continuing to 
support and shape the disaster research that followed yours. 
 v 
Within the lab, I am overwhelmingly grateful for the camaraderie and love that my 
labmates have given me over the years. Thank you so much to Abby, Susie, Lei, Neda, 
Praga, Dimitri, and Yuli. Without your constant willingness to review my work, give me 
honest feedback, and brainstorm with me on solving a seemingly endless stream of 
problems, I could never have come this far. 
I owe so much of any success that I have had to my family. Thank you to my father 
for his unending faith in me, his wry good humor, and his conviction that I would 
eventually be where I am now: submitting my PhD thesis. Thank you to my mother for 
constantly pushing me to do more, for her constant support, and for always encouraging 
me to go that last extra mile. Thank you to my stepmother for her welcoming heart and for 
always being willing to listen when I felt like I had run out of options. 
My incredible friends are as dear to me as family. They have gone above and 
beyond the call of duty in encouraging me, supporting me, and forgiving me when I had to 
cancel a plan or forgot to respond to yet another message. I am so sorry not to be able to 
call you all by name, so here are but a few who carried me when I would have surely fallen: 
Kirstie, Emmy, Laura, Jolyn, Chris, Wen, Stephanie, Jolyn, India, Lamb, and Julie. Thank 
you to the cosplay crew, the Chattahoochee crew, the Washington & Lee crew, the Barbell 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ix 
LIST OF Abbreviations AND Symbols xiii 
SUMMARY xv 
CHAPTER 1. Introduction 1 
1.1 Increasing global risks and at-risk populations 1 
1.2 Volunteered geographic information 2 
1.3 Equity and actionability in social media usage 5 
1.4 Dissertation framing and structure 5 
CHAPTER 2. Silence of the Tweets: Incorporating social media activity drop-offs 
into crisis detection 9 
2.1 Abstract 9 
2.2 Background 10 
2.3 Methods 15 
2.3.1 Twitter data acquisition 18 
2.3.2 Temporal segmentation 19 
2.3.3 Spatial segmentation 21 
2.3.4 Twitter deviation analysis 22 
2.3.5 Infrastructure damage validation 25 
2.3.6 Correlations between Twitter activity and damage 26 
2.4 Results 27 
2.4.1 Twitter Usage Characterization 27 
2.4.2 Rank comparisons 30 
2.4.3 Hurricane Harvey (Aug 24-Aug 31) 36 
2.4.4 Hurricane Irma (Sept 9-Sept 17) 36 
2.4.5 Hurricane Nate  (Oct 8-Oct 15) 37 
2.5 Discussion 37 
2.5.1 Limitations and Future Directions 41 
2.6 Conclusion 43 
2.7 Acknowledgements 44 
CHAPTER 3. Tipping the scales: How analytical scale affects the interpretation of 
social media behavior in crisis research 45 
3.1 Abstract 45 
3.2 Background 45 
3.3 Methods 51 
3.3.1 Twitter Data 51 
 vii 
3.3.2 Population Data 53 
3.4 Spatial Nets 56 
3.4.1 Analytical Methods 59 
3.5 Results 61 
3.6 Discussion 70 
3.6.1 Limitations and Future Work 77 
3.7 Conclusion 78 
3.8 Acknowledgements 79 
CHAPTER 4. Deepening the Divide: Crises Disproportionately Silence Vulnerable 
Populations on Social Media 80 
4.1 Abstract 80 
4.2 Background 81 
4.3 Methods 86 
4.3.1 Social Media Data Acquisition 86 
4.3.2 Distributing Demographic Data 88 
4.3.3 Scalar Aggregation Nets 93 
4.3.4 Principal Component Regression Analysis 97 
4.4 Results 100 
4.5 Discussion 105 
4.5.1 Limitations and Future Work 110 
4.6 Conclusions 113 
4.7 Data Availability Statement 115 
4.8 Acknowledgements 115 
CHAPTER 5. Contributions 116 
5.1 Silence of the Tweets 117 
5.2 Tipping the Scales 119 
5.3 Deepening the Divide 121 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Description of the temporal segmentation for the Twitter data. 20 
Table 2 Spearman rank correlation coefficients between social media deviation 
metrics and infrastructure damage across the perturbed state. 
33 
Table 3 Kendall rank correlation coefficients between social media deviation 
metrics and infrastructure damage across the perturbed state. 
33 
Table 4 Multiple linear regression results for the NLCD land class types and 
the census data. 
55 
Table 5 Results of the maximum likelihood estimation of sample distribution 
fit to power laws. 
70 
Table 6 Multiple linear regression results for the NLCD land class types and 
the census data. 
90 
Table 7 Variable coefficients derived from the PCR model for the steady state 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 The geographic extent of the study area. The cities of interest are 
indicated with black circles. The US counties included in the study 
are colored according to which hurricane’s impact was studied. 
17 
Figure 2 The extent of the FEMA Building Level Damage Assessments 
across the southeastern United States and the United States territory 
Puerto Rico for the 2017 Hurricane Season. Each dot indicates a 
single building that has been assessed on an ordinal damage scale. 
The damage scale transitions from dark green (affected) to red 
(destroyed). 
17 
Figure 3 (Left) Houston, Texas overlaid with a white-lined grid composed of 
10 km2 hexagons. Blue dots are used to indicate the location of 
Tweets accumulated during one day of the steady state for the city. 
(Middle) The average daily Tweet counts for Houston, Texas across 
the steady state period. Darker red hexagons indicate higher average 
daily Tweet counts, while paler yellow hexagons indicate lower 
average daily Tweet counts. (Right) The absolute deviations in 
Twitter activity for Houston, Texas on August 27th, 2017, Harvey’s 
second landfall. Darker red hexagons indicate higher amounts of 
change in Twitter activity from steady state averages, and paler 
yellow hexagons indicate lower amounts of change. 
25 
Figure 4 Violin plot depicting the distributions of Twitter activity counts 
recorded across all of the eight-hour periods during the steady and 
perturbed states for each region of interest. The distributions of the 
steady states are depicted in blue, and the distributions of the 
perturbed state are depicted in yellow. The width of each violin 
depicts a greater density of values within that region, and the length 
of the violin represents the range of 95% of the data. Box plots are 
overlaid on each violin that depict the median as a black line down 
the center and one standard deviation on either side of the median 
composing the first and third quartile. 
29 
Figure 5 Density plot depicting the distribution of deviation values recorded 
from all of the hexagons across all of the perturbed state (seven days) 
for each city. Negative values indicate hexagons that decreased in 
activity from the steady state to the perturbed state. The different 
colored areas indicate the different cities. 
30 
Figure 6 Lollipop chart comparing the rank correlation coefficients for the 
raw and absolute Twitter deviations across study regions on the day 
the regions experienced the most infrastructure damage according to 
recorded rainfall and wind conditions and NOAA reports. Kendall’s 
τ is depicted with a circle containing a “K” and Spearman’s ρ is 
depicted with a circle containing an “S”. The values for the raw 
deviation depicted in yellow, and those for the absolute deviation are 
32 
 x 
depicted in blue. Values that were statistically significant (p<0.05) 
are shown with filled circles, while those that were statistically 
insignificant (p>0.05) are shown with hollow circles. 
Figure 7 Lollipop chart comparing the rank correlation coefficients for the 
raw and absolute Twitter deviations observed in Houston, Texas 
across the days of the perturbed state. Kendall’s τ is depicted with a 
circle containing a “K” and Spearman’s ρ is depicted with a circle 
containing an “S”. The values for the raw deviation depicted in 
yellow, and those for the absolute deviation are depicted in blue. 
Values that were statistically significant (p<0.05) are shown with 
filled circles, while those that were statistically insignificant 
(p>0.05) are shown with hollow circles. 
35 
Figure 8 The steady state distributions of 5 random areas within the 50 km2 
areas spatial net (left) and the 1 km2 areas spatial net (right). 
53 
Figure 9 (Left) Spatial net consisting of 1 km2 hexagons across Houston. 
(Right) Spatial net consisting of 80 km2 hexagons across Houston. 
59 
Figure 10 Comparison of the likelihood that the spatial nets have different daily 
distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov II test.  The census 
tracts net is represented in the furthest left column and bottom row.  
The top two figures were created from steady state values (August 
8th and August 12th), and the bottom two figures were created from 
perturbed state values (August 26th and August 27th).  The black 
arrows indicate the first pair of nets, by increasing scale, that are 
statistically distinct from the next smallest net.  The purple arrows 
indicate pockets of statistically indistinct distributions at the 0.5 - 1 
km2 scale that appear in the perturbed state. 
63 
Figure 11 Comparison of the densities of extreme and non-normal social media 
behavior for four spatial nets (0.25 km2, 1 km2, 5 km2, and 35 km2). 
The colors represent different days of the perturbed state, and peaks 
closer to 0 or 1.0 indicate values that are either lower or higher than 
most of the values observed in the region’s steady state. 
65 
Figure 12 Comparison of the percentages of areas exhibiting non-normal or 
extremely low Twitter activity behavior between spatial nets, fit to 
power law distributions. 
67 
Figure 13 Comparison of the percentages of areas exhibiting non-normal or 
extremely high Twitter activity behavior between spatial nets, fit to 
power law distributions. 
67 
Figure 14 The relationship between the percentage of the total study area (the 
greater metropolitan area of Houston) excluded from the analysis on 
account of not having sufficient Twitter activity, as defined in 
Section 2.3, and the geographic scale at which the data was 
aggregated. 
68 
Figure 15 Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient strength between Twitter 
Activity per person and the average FEMA building damage 
assessment rating within each area. 
69 
 xi 
Figure 16 A comparison of the geographical distribution of processed Twitter 
posts across the city of Houston for different days. Darker green 
hexagons indicate low Twitter activity, whereas brighter yellow 
hexagons indicate higher Twitter activity. (Left) is a heatmap for a 
day of the steady state (August 7th, 2017); (middle) is a heatmap for 
a day of the transitionary state (August 20th, 2017); and (right) is a 
heatmap for a day of the perturbed state (August 27th, 2017). 
88 
Figure 17 A comparison of the redistributed census data and a uniform, equal-
area hexagonal net. (Left) the green areas indicate areas with lower 
population density, and those in red indicate areas with high 
population density. (Right) Each hexagon contains 80 km2; larger 
hexagons were used in place of those used in the analysis (5 km2) for 
improve readability. 
94 
Figure 18 A density graph depicting the distribution of the log of the average 
Twitter activity across the steady state (pink) and the average Twitter 
activity across the perturbed state (blue). 
94 
Figure 19 Maps depicting the short-listed hexagons used in the PCR analysis. 
The hexagons are colored to indicate the relative number of persons 
within those areas that are described by a vulnerability factor, with a 
lighter blue indicating fewer vulnerable people and a darker blue 
indicating more vulnerable people. (Left) shows the distribution of 
disabled peoples, and (Right) shows the distribution of unemployed 
peoples. Overlaid across the hexagons is the distribution of FEMA 
Building Level damage assessments, which are colored on a gradient 
from dark green to red, with green indicating less damage and red 
indicating more damage. 
96 
Figure 20 A Pearson correlation matrix displaying the covariance of the 
sociodemographic factors selected for the vulnerability analysis. The 
factors included were the percentage of: crowded homes, people in 
poverty, people with limited English-speaking abilities, no high 
school diploma, the uninsured, unemployed people, people with 
physical disabilities, single-parent households, people under 17, 
people in minority groups, people living in apartments, people over 
the age of 65, and people without a vehicle. 
98 
Figure 21 Graphs depicting the relationship between the RMSEP and the 
number of components included in the PCR model for (top) Twitter 
activity prediction in the steady state period, (middle) on Hurricane 
Harvey’s first landfall (August 25th, 2017), and (bottom) on the 
second landfall (August 27th, 2017). The dashed blue vertical lines 
indicate the number of components selected to be incorporated into 
the final models through the one-sigma method. The blue circles 
indicate the one-sigma bands around the RMSEP values. The light 
gray dotted line shows the absolute minimum. 
101 
Figure 22 Graphs depicting the contribution of individual vulnerability factors 
to the first three principal components developed through PCA for 
(top) Twitter activity prediction in the steady state period, (middle) 
102 
 xii 
on Hurricane Harvey’s first landfall (August 25th, 2017), and 
(bottom) on the second landfall (August 27th, 2017). The black lines 
indicate the weights associated with the separate PC1s; the red 
dashed lines indicate those for the separate PC2s; and the green 
dotted lines indicate those for the separate PC3s. 
Figure 23 A barplot depicting, in pink, the percentage of variance in Twitter 
activity explained by the percentage of vulnerable populations within 
each area, and in blue, the amount of rainfall recorded at the Houston 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
API Application Program Interface 
ASCE  American Society of Civil Engineers 
CDC Centers for Disease Control 
CDF Cumulative Density Function 
CV Cross-Validation 
EMDAT Emergency Events Database 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GIS Geographic Information Science 
IIS Information and Intelligent Systems 
K-S test Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
MAUP Modifiable Area Unit Problem 
NLCD National Land Cover Database 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
NSF National Science Foundation 
PC1 First Principal Component 
PCA Principal Component Analysis 
PCR  Principal Component Regression 
RMSEP Root Mean Square Error of Prediction 
SVI Social Vulnerability index 
US United States 
VGI Volunteered Geographic Information 




𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 Number of Tweets (activity) observed in a defined period in a hexagon 
within the perturbed state 
𝛼𝛼 Scaling constant for a power law function 
𝛽𝛽 Power coefficient for a power law function 
𝛽𝛽0 Regression intercept term 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 Regression coefficient 
𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎 Twitter activity deviation 
𝜖𝜖 Regression error term 
HighIntt Number of cells described as “High Intensity (Developed)” 
km Kilometers 
LowIntt Number of cells described as “Low Intensity (Developed)” within the tract 
MedIntt Number of cells described as “Medium Intensity (Developed)” 
m Meters 
𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 Average number of Tweets observed in that area during the steady state 
 xiv 
OpenAreat Number of NLCD cells described as “Open Space (Developed)” within the 
census tract 
PC1 The first principal component 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 Population represented by a single 30mx30m NLCD raster cell point of 
NLCD type i within a specific census tract 
Popt Population for a given census tract t 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  Total population within the census tract in which the point is located 
𝜌𝜌 Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 Standard deviation of the Tweet counts observed during the steady state. 
𝜏𝜏 Kendall rank correlation coefficient 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  Total number of points of type i within the specific census tract 
TwActstate Daily Tweets per person in the temporal state being analyzed 
WAi Weighted average for the specific land type 
 xv 
SUMMARY 
Increasingly large numbers of people are living in areas susceptible to catastrophic 
disasters because of urban sprawl (Allen 2006) and worsening extreme weather patterns 
from climate change (Adachi et al. 2017).  While more severe weather events is becoming 
more of a certainty than a possibility (Hauer et al. 2016), the extent of the impact on humans 
and society can be mitigated through improved resource planning and resource agility by 
increasing real-time information on human location, activity, and responsiveness (Roshan 
et al. 2016). New and varied forms of information from humans-as-sensors are being 
utilized in crisis response, and there has been a substantial push towards finding ways of 
applying data such as social media to emergency responder needs on the ground and at 
higher levels of decision-making (Lachlan et al. 2016; Reuter et al. 2018; Spence et al. 
2016).  However, although many potential uses for social media information have been 
identified across crisis informatics, a number of both ethical and computational biases have 
been identified as well. An important area for research is identifying these biases, the 
effects they have on disadvantaged populations, and how to mitigate that bias in the 
growing body of work designed to utilize social media in crisis situations. Within this 
dissertation, I describe three studies that identify, define, and utilize select limitations in 
social media for crisis response. In the first of these studies, I examine the prevalence and 
significance of decreases in social media activity from normal state to crisis conditions. 
Through correlating changes in social media usage and infrastructural damage, I show the 
importance of considering social media usage drop-offs in crisis identification.  In the 
second, I examine the influence of geographic scale on the statistical reliability of social 
 xvi 
media data and the correlation between social media and infrastructural damage. By 
varying the geographic scales at which I aggregate behavior, I show the high sensitivity of 
social media usage analytics to scale and the consequences of neglecting to incorporate 
scale into existing research conclusions. For the third, I examine the effect of social 
vulnerability factors on the presence or absence of social media data during a disaster. By 
comparing the contribution of social vulnerability factors to social media data availability 
during a normal state and a crisis state, I show that social vulnerability contributes heavily 
to a decrease in data in a crisis state that is not present during a normal state. The results of 
this work inform the reliable extent of social media data and its sensitivity to external 
factors (i.e. infrastructure damage and the presence of vulnerable populations) and 
analytical factors (i.e. spatiotemporal scale, aggregation, and bursting behavior). This work 
is ultimately driven by the need for our cities to improve as disasters are worsening. Social 
media analytics offer one method of improving our crisis response; however, any new 
technology holds the danger of leaving certain populations—especially vulnerable 
populations—behind. By pinpointing disparities in the representational capacities of the 
data and proposing alternative methods of use, I hope to improve the usability and equity 
of social media data for crisis response. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Increasing global risks and at-risk populations 
The global cost of disasters and the number of people affected by them have been 
increasing steadily over the last few decades (EMDAT 2020). Part of this is due to urban 
sprawl; more people than ever are living in areas, such as the coastline, that are susceptible 
to weather event-induced disasters (Allen 2006). The urban population in the United States 
(US) continues to grow, and coastal cities are growing even faster than their inland 
counterparts. This phenomenon is what has been referred to as the ‘expanding bullseye’ 
effect: the expanding coastal populations are becoming a larger target for extreme storms 
to hit (Ashley et al. 2014). Secondarily, an increase in extreme weather patterns is 
anticipated to be a major consequence of worsening climate change (Adachi et al. 2017). 
Alongside an increase in weather extremity, hurricanes especially are predicted to behave 
in more erratic patterns. This includes a decrease in lateral movement, causing the storms 
to deposit more rain on impacted cities and also to impact cities that have historically been 
in less danger from powerful storms (Noy 2016). Direct losses from hurricane and flood 
damages have tripled across the past fifty years, and the Southeast in particular has seen 
economic impacts outpacing population growth (Gall et al. 2011). As both populations at 
risk and the severity of those risks continue to increase, finding innovative ways to protect 
large coastal communities will become more necessary.   
One of the critical pieces of this puzzle is improved, agile emergency management. 
Disasters are notorious for being situations in which reliable, specific information is scarce, 
and immediate, deadly crises can happen at relatively small scales (Quarantelli 2003; 
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Wurman and Kosiba 2018). Emergency managers need specific information about the 
“what, when, where, and who” of these local crises (Yang et al. 2013), and one potential 
source of that information has been identified as the people living in the impacted 
community. With the surge in online communication and number of ways people can 
contribute to news sources and information repositories, the utilization of this non-
traditional form of information is becoming both more possible and more necessary. 
1.2 Volunteered geographic information 
Community- and place-based resilience has long been at the forefront of improving 
crisis response (Cutter et al. 2008). Finding new ways to utilize the members of a 
community that are inclined towards pro-social behavior—which has been shown to 
predominate in disaster situations—is one method of increasing community resilience. As 
one of the greatest strengths of community members is their knowledge of the impacted 
place and the people residing there, volunteered geographic information (VGI) has 
significantly helped emergency management in both the “Response” and “Recovery” 
stages of disasters (Reuter and Kaufhold 2017). VGI is information contributed by the 
community regarding the location or condition of local problems or resources. It can 
include which roads are open, where the power is out, where trees are blocking roads, and 
calls for help. For instance, one of the most utilized forms of VGI is OpenStreetMap, a site 
in which people can review satellite footage or offer on-the-ground insight as to local 
dangers and intact streets (Eckle and de Albuquerque 2015). It was instrumental in the 
response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake, when information about local needs and available 
resources was scarce (Zook et al. 2010). In part due to the success of VGI applications such 
 3 
as OpenStreetMap and Ushahidi in 2010, response organizations began looking for ways 
to incorporate that and other forms of VGI into their official response plans. 
Currently, VGI (especially in the form of social media) is being utilized in an 
official capacity by the American Red Cross, the United Nations in various resilience 
efforts, the Humanitarian Tracker, and many other nonprofits (Gao et al. 2011; Imran et al. 
2014; Lovejoy et al. 2012). In a less official capacity, local emergency managers have 
taken to monitoring social media streams manually, searching specific hashtags and 
opening communication pathways through government accounts. These managers also 
predict an increase in their utilization of VGI through platforms such as social media to 
both send messages and receive them to improve situational awareness (Hiltz and Kushma 
2014). Social media as a form of VGI is notable for containing information from eye-
witness accounts and being available in near-real time. Twitter in particular has seen 
substantial usage due to its ease of access via the Twitter streaming Application Program 
Interface (API) and the sheer quantity of posts available through that API. The number of 
Twitter users has been steadily increasing since Twitter was founded in 2006, with 330 
million monthly users and almost 150 million daily users (Twitter 2018), so the information 
contained within its data stream covers a wide range of users and topics. Historically, users 
were able to choose whether or not to include a geotag—a latitude and longitude pair—
within their posts. Currently, users are able to do the same thing with pictures taken through 
the Twitter app. The prevalence of geotagged information with high location accuracy, the 
potential of a picture of the situation, and a user that can be contacted for additional 
information has motivated substantial usage of Twitter data. 
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Unfortunately, although the quantity of posts has a positive impact on the amount 
of information Twitter can provide, there is also a lot of unrelated or unreliable data 
included in the datastream (Starbird et al. 2014). This, in turn, has motivated substantial 
research projects devoted automatically parsing the Twitter datastream and finding ways 
to reliably and accurately utilize Twitter posts to aid in crisis mitigation efforts.  
The incorporation of VGI has been useful for tracking individuals’ mobility and the 
influence of a disaster on that mobility (Wang et al., 2017), the change of individuals’ 
sentiment in response to different disaster impact levels (Wang and Taylor, 2018), and to 
identify infrastructure service disruptions using social media data mid-disaster (Fan and 
Mostafavi 2019). Research using spatiotemporal aggregation to compare two spatial 
datasets has shown that bursts of social media behavior and disaster-related posts can 
indicate areas of relatively higher hurricane damage (Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016) and the 
location of flooding (de Albuquerque et al. 2015). Looking forward, VGI has been 
proposed for use in digital twin city frameworks for assessing infrastructural 
vulnerabilities, thus improving disaster resilience and preparedness (Xu et al. 2016), and 
for improving the situational awareness of emergency responders using the digital twin 
through integrated text, image, and geopositioning analysis (Fan et al. 2020). 
However, across fifteen years of crisis research, the field has focused primarily on 
where and how social media data can be employed at broad scales (Reuter and Kaufhold 
2018). There is considerable need to further investigate the question of where and how 
social media data can be used equitably.  
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1.3 Equity and actionability in social media usage 
Big data research—and social media is a form of big data with its high volume, 
variety, velocity, and questionable veracity—has often been critiqued for overlooking 
human variability and for mistaking big data for complete data (Blumenstock 2018; 
Gandomi and Haider 2015). These two fallacies can also be found intertwined in some 
aspects of existing crisis informatics, as one of the critical dilemmas with humans-as-
sensors analyses is that humans are not reliable sensors.  Humans do not transmit 
consistent, coordinated, or comparable information through public data channels that can 
be continuously accessed by connected emergency responders or data analysts.  The rush 
to utilize information produced by humans in disasters has neglected to incorporate the 
diversity of human response and capabilities, impairing proper management and 
stewardship of that information.  
There is a substantial need in research to investigate how the bias inherent in social 
media and existing methods of social media analyses affect the types of information 
produced for emergency management. From sample bias to survivorship bias, the biases 
inherent in who produces what during a crisis need to be explored prior to the development 
and utilization of social media-parsing applications for crisis informatics. To enable this, 
the boundaries of use and the consequences of failing to account for these biases need to 
be defined in the context of emergency identification and response. 
1.4 Dissertation framing and structure 
Social media is a new and promising form of crisis information that, as a non-
traditional form of communication, has seen a surprisingly exponential increase in global 
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use. It is one potential method of improving community resilience in the face of increasing 
weather-related disasters caused by climate change. New methods of parsing usable 
information from social media have shown substantial potential for enabling social media’s 
use in crisis response; however, further assessments of where and how social media can be 
used equitably are necessary. This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the 
limits of social media analyses in the context of both our existing methods of analyses and 
the socioeconomic disparities of social media’s use. Below, I detail three studies in which 
I assess potential biases inherent in the existing methods of examining social media for 
emergency response. 
In Chapter 2, I examine potential survivorship bias in the existing use of activity 
bursts of social media as a form of crisis identification. Research has shown that bursts of 
social media activity are positively correlated with infrastructural damage. However, 
criticisms of that data have shown that some areas with large amounts of damage were 
silent on social media during the disaster. The significance of that social media silence in 
crisis informatics analyses and the potential benefits of using it to rapidly assess damage 
had not been investigated. To address this need, I compared social media activity before 
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Nate in nine affected cities to social media activity during 
each hurricane to determine the social media activity deviation. I determined the correlation 
between infrastructure damage and 1) the absolute activity deviation (the magnitude of the 
change), and 2) the raw activity deviation (the direction and magnitude of the change). The 
article presented in Chapter 2 has been published in Natural Hazards. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the impacts of the modifiable areal unit problem on social 
media data availability. In identifying crises through social media, contextualizing the data 
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is critical for understanding the magnitude and severity of the crisis. As shown in Chapter 
2, the temporal context (i.e. historical data) is important; this chapter analyzes the 
geographical context. Many detection algorithms identify prominent clusters of activity 
across varying geographic ranges, and historical contextualization most often occurs at a 
specific geographic range. To address potential bias in data clustering and aggregation, I 
investigated the impact of spatial scale on the results of a) activity burst identification, b) 
historical contextualization, and c) the strength of the correlation between social media 
activity and infrastructural damage. To do so, I aggregated social media data across 
multiple geographic scales ranging from 0.25 km2 to 80 km2 and analyzed the changes in 
distributions related to extreme activity changes, the statistical robustness of historical data 
availability, and the correlation between social media activity and infrastructural damage. 
The article presented in Chapter 3 has been developed into a journal paper and will be 
submitted to a journal that specializes in Geographic Information Science (GIS) and its 
applications to engineering problems. 
In Chapter 4, I further explore the concepts shown in Chapter 2 that social media 
silence during a disaster is more likely to be indicative of crisis than not. I theorized that 
social vulnerability attributes were likely associated with that silence. If this were the case, 
usage of social media data without social contextualization would prioritize resource 
distribution to the least vulnerable instead of the most. I additionally wanted to test whether 
a decrease in social media presence in areas with more vulnerable populations could be 
predicted from the pre-crisis period. To examine this, I used the Centers for Disease 
Control’s (CDC’s) Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) to determine the percentage of people 
ascribing to 13 different vulnerability factors in each area, then determined the average 
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social media activity level in a steady state and the social media activity level in those areas 
during a hurricane. I used principle component analysis to transform the vulnerability 
factors into uncorrelated variables because of the high degree of multicollinearity in the 
factors. I then regressed these components to analyze the contribution of the components 
to the social media activity in the steady state and the perturbed state and compared the 
results. The article presented in Chapter 4 has been developed into a journal paper and has 
been published by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Journal of 
Management in Engineering.  
Finally, Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the overarching contributions of this 
work to how the crisis informatics field develops and applies social media to emergency 
management. This work has incorporated insights from the fields of critical GIS, social 
vulnerability science, emergency management, and information science, and I discuss 
potential new research that is suggested or could become possible following the 
conclusions listed in each study. 
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CHAPTER 2. SILENCE OF THE TWEETS: INCORPORATING 
SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY DROP-OFFS INTO CRISIS 
DETECTION1 
2.1 Abstract 
Although extreme events are inevitable, the associated cost to infrastructure and 
human life is not. We can mitigate these costs through improving the information available 
to emergency responders during and after crisis events via social media. Recent research 
has identified a correlation between spikes of Twitter activity and the infrastructural 
damage incurred during natural disasters. This research, however, overlooks emergencies 
occurring in areas in which people have lost power, lack the ability to connect to the 
internet, or, due to differences in social media perceptions, are uncompelled to Tweet 
during a disaster. To assess the prevalence of Twitter activity decreases and the relative 
importance of those decreases in detecting areas in crisis, we study crisis-driver Twitter 
activity deviations from “normal” in nine cities affected by the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane 
Season. In analyzing more than 1.1 million Tweets across the season, we find that there is 
a stronger, more significant correlation between infrastructure damage and a metric that 
prioritizes both increases and decreases in Twitter activity than one that prioritizes only 
Twitter activity increases. These findings indicate that social media drop-offs could be 
 
1 This chapter is published in the journal Natural Hazards with Neda Mohammadi and John E. 
Taylor as the co-authors. The citation for the journal article is as follows: Samuels, R., Mohammadi, N., and 
Taylor, J.E. (2020). “Silence of the Tweets: Incorporating social media activity drop-offs into crisis 
detection.” Natural Hazards. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-020-04044-2 
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representative of significant distress, and accounting for the apparent survivorship bias in 
social media will be critical to the equitable use of social media in crisis applications.   
2.2 Background 
The 2017 hurricane season broke many records in the United States; it produced 
more Category 5 hurricanes than any other, broke the record for the strongest hurricane 
recorded in the Atlantic, and was the costliest hurricane season to date. The ensuing 2018 
Atlantic Hurricane Season continued to wreak above-average devastation, becoming the 
third consecutive season to produce a Category 5 hurricane (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 2018). Unfortunately, the rise of both sea level and global 
temperatures is expected to continue to contribute to an increase in intensity and frequency 
of extreme weather events (Noy 2016). Contemporaneously, the number of people living 
in coastal cities is rapidly increasing, even more so than those cities' landlocked 
counterparts (Hauer et al. 2016). The increased populations and infrastructure on the 
coastline have resulted in an 'expanding bullseye' for these increasingly deadly storms to 
hit (Ashley et al. 2014). As both of these phenomena are predicted to continue and to 
increase in intensity, emergency professionals and urban planners will need to improve 
their response capabilities. One aspect of this is to improve the quantity and scope of the 
information utilized in crisis management.  
Actionable information is one of the most necessary yet most difficult to obtain 
resources in the midst of an ongoing disaster. Especially for events that cover a broad 
geographic and demographic range, crisis managers rarely have access to timely and 
specific information (Reuter et al. 2018). There is a broad area of research in the field of 
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crisis informatics that seeks to translate diverse sources of data into actionable information 
for decision-makers. One of the most popular big data sources that has come to prominence 
in the last decade is that of social media. Social media has been recognized as a potential 
source of human network information for fifteen years and researched as a potential source 
of crisis information for at least ten (Reuter and Kaufhold 2018). Applications monitoring 
social media data have been used by organizations such as the Red Cross and the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Imran et al. 2014). Through 
utilizing this information as data from a “new” type of sensor—or, rather humans-as-
sensors—researchers have been able to expand the quantity and types of crisis information 
specific to both individual residents and broad geographic regions during disasters.  
The types of information produced through social media can include a unique user 
identifier, the time at which the information was published, the content itself (which can 
include text and images), the geographic region in which the user posted the information, 
a link to another site, and information about how the information has spread. Not all posts 
include all of this information, and some studies use information gleaned through 
determining connections between different posts or users (Caragea et al. 2014). For the 
sake of clarity and brevity, we focus on the social media information available through 
Twitter. Twitter data has been the most commonly utilized humans-as-sensors data in the 
social media sphere due to the relative ease with which it can be accessed (Steiger et al. 
2015), and, as our paper also utilizes that data, that is what we will primarily describe. 
Additionally, its ease of use does not imply a decreased utility; Twitter has a reported 326 
million average monthly users and more than 500 million Tweets per day (Twitter 2018). 
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The utilization of this information in the field of crisis response has taken many 
forms. These forms tend to have been built primarily along one of two distinct but 
intertwining pathways: first, filtering individual posts for directly usable information, and 
second, analyzing variances in information production for spatial, topical, or temporal 
closeness (Wang et al. 2016; Weiler et al. 2016; Resch et al. 2018). Research utilizing the 
first seek explanations of need, resource availability, blocked roads, and the emergence of 
new disasters (Cameron et al. 2012; Purohit et al. 2014). The second utilizes broad-scale 
aggregated posting behavior changes like sudden increases in a specific topic or sudden 
bursts of activity in a localized area to inform the credibility of a disaster’s occurrence or 
the extent of a disaster’s influence, such as the extent of flooding near the River Elbe 
(Herfort et al. 2014; de Albuquerque et al. 2015). By interpreting both the individual 
Tweets and the broader Twitter stream, the spatial, temporal, and topical characteristics of 
the data have been employed to develop models that can detect emergencies (Imran et al. 
2015), identify emergency types (Xu et al. 2016), rapidly assess areas experiencing 
hurricane-related damage or severe conditions (Guan and Chen 2014), detect resource 
availability and need (Purohit et al. 2014), identify human sentiment in real time, correlate 
human sentiment with disaster intensity (Wang and Taylor 2018), detect the emergence of 
new, unspecified disasters (Wang and Taylor 2019), and characterize resilience and 
community recovery through mobility patterns (Spence et al. 2015). 
That said, although great strides have been made since the conception of crisis 
informatics and the availability of more big data, we are still stretching and testing the 
limits of what this data can do and where it is applicable. Big data as a whole has been 
routinely criticized for increasing the existing disparities between privileged and 
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underprivileged groups, and social media's user demographics are far from broadly 
representative (Blumenstock 2018). Especially in the world of crisis informatics, 
understanding the scope of the diversity of human interactions with social media in crises 
will be critical to mitigating these harmful data biases. Within this paper, we seek to explore 
the survivorship aspect of the data bias introduced through the analysis of social media data 
during a crisis. 
First, we note that data bias is introduced when a system’s characteristics are 
described by a reduced set of information. This reduction in information happens when 
analyzing individual posts, as their context in the broader stream is lost, and when 
analyzing the broader stream as an aggregate of individual posts, as the text-specific 
information is lost. Most recent applications use a combination of the two methods in 
tandem to increase data richness, and many studies have been performed analyzing data 
streams across different phases of a disaster, like preparedness, response, recovery (Yang 
et al. 2013; Bakkensen et al. 2017; Zou et al. 2018a). Additionally, especially when using 
humans-as-sensors, there is plenty of bias in which humans choose to contribute to the data 
stream at any given time. The demographics of Twitter are fairly well understood, and the 
demographics of vulnerable populations contributing to the data stream have additionally 
been explored (Zou et al. 2018b; Wang et al. 2019). However, as far as the authors are 
aware, no social media-based crisis response applications have considered potential data 
loss created by the transition of the sensors—in this case, the humans—from a non-crisis 
state to a crisis state. Without incorporating the possible effects of state-transition data loss, 
the data that exists during a crisis is prioritized, and those who have dropped out of the 
stream are neglected.  
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Human sensors are distinct from physical sensors, like flood height monitors, 
because we are rarely aware of when or how the sensors are “turned off”. Especially in the 
context of social media crisis research, which has generally operated on the idea that people 
Tweet more in response to a non-normal stimulus due to the identification of Twitter bursts 
(Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016; Fan and Mostafavi 2019), the identification of people who have 
stopped Tweeting is a sorely lacking area of investigation. The field has continually 
increased the contextualization of the used data, but when we only work with visible data, 
we could be missing the neglected populations that are going dark instead. Shelton et al. 
identify this darkness as a potential problem during Hurricane Sandy when they found that 
50% of deaths in New York occurred in an area with relative social media silence (Shelton 
et al. 2014). Similarly, Xiao et al. highlighted the potential influence of hurricanes on the 
“digital divide” with respect to lower socioeconomic groups having more limited access to 
technologies (Xiao et al. 2015). These findings call for the need to characterize the extent 
of these geographic “data shadows” and to define their impact on the capacity of social 
media to identify localized areas of hurricane damage. There is also a research gap with 
respect to how these shadows change from non-perturbed to perturbed state. 
Similarly, although we know that these data shadows exist and shroud some local 
crises, research has not shown how to see through them. Twitter data is unlikely to ever 
give us actionable information from people who do not have a Twitter account, but we may 
not be limited to those people who are only Tweeting during the storm. People that have 
lost the compulsion or ability to Tweet may, in fact, be in more danger than those that are 
still Tweeting. To test this, we need to understand if these drop-offs (and so potentially 
these people) can be identified through different methods of analysis beyond in situ Twitter 
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activity or topic bursts. Thus, we first devise an approach to characterize and identify the 
changes in Twitter activity from a baseline state. Then, using that approach, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: A crisis metric that prioritizes both social media activity increases and drop-
offs is more strongly and significantly correlated with infrastructure damage than one that 
only prioritizes activity increases. 
In testing this hypothesis, we determine whether prioritizing social media activity 
drop-offs could aid in the identification of extreme hurricane damage. If they are, we need 
to include or acknowledge them in our crisis response applications so that silenced 
populations are not disproportionately ignored. In this paper, we report correlations 
between infrastructural damage and the magnitude of social media activity change from a 
defined baseline, or steady state. By focusing on social media posting activity changes from 
a steady state, and thus incorporating social media signal drop-offs, we hope to demonstrate 
how to increase the usability of social media data for emergency responders while reducing 
the risk of ignoring areas that do not have the ability or compulsion to Tweet. 
2.3 Methods 
We analyzed the Twitter posting behavioral shifts from non-crisis to crisis 
conditions and the incurred infrastructural damage for ten regions across the southeastern 
United States during four named storms in the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season. These 
regions include two affected by Hurricane Harvey (Beaumont, Texas and Houston, Texas), 
five affected by Hurricane Irma (Tampa, Florida; Miami, Florida; the Florida Keys; Fort 
Myers, Florida; and Jacksonville, Florida), one affected by Hurricane Maria (the U.S. 
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territory of Puerto Rico), and two affected by Hurricane Nate (Biloxi, Mississippi and 
Mobile, Alabama). The counties associated with those regions (determined through 
defining the Metropolitan Statistical Areas of each city) and the damage distribution of the 
four hurricanes are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. The damage distribution 
is represented through Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Building Level 
Damage Assessments performed two to five days following the hurricanes’ landfalls. 
The residential populations of the studied regions range from 70,000 to almost three 
million, and the number of Tweets produced per day in each region ranged from 200 to 
500 in the Florida Keys to 10,000 to 15,000 in Houston, Texas. From this, we calculated a 
broad spectrum of Twitter penetration (number of Tweets per person) and Twitter usage 
seasonality (how Twitter activity varies from day to day) within the regions. The lowest 
Twitter penetration in the steady state was observed as 0.0017 in Biloxi, MS, and the 
highest penetration during the steady state was 0.0081 in Houston, TX. During the 
perturbed state, the lowest was 0.0001 in the Florida Keys, and the highest was 0.065 in 
Miami, Florida. In terms of variation in activity, we observed increases in average Twitter 
usage on the order of 40-70% on weekends for each region. As our total data set included 
a number of US holidays such as July 4th and Labor Day, we also noted that social events 
increased the number of produced Tweets. The hurricanes that impacted these cities, while 
all dangerous storms, also differed in wind speed, rainfall, amount and speed of flooding, 
and, ultimately, the broad scale infrastructure damaged caused. Crisis management differed 
as well, as some cities had evacuation orders well in advance—more than 6 million people 
evacuated for Hurricane Irma (Reynard and Shirgaokar 2019)—while others did not have 
widespread evacuation orders at all (Milliner et al. 2018).  
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Figure 1. The geographic extent of the study area. The cities of interest are indicated with 
black circles. Areas are colored according to which hurricane’s impact was studied. 
 
Figure 2. The extent of the FEMA Building Level Damage Assessments across the 
southeastern US for the 2017 Hurricane Season. Each dot indicates a building that has been 
assessed. The damage scale transitions from dark green (affected) to red (destroyed). 
 18 
With our areas of interest defined, we proceeded to acquire the Twitter posts from 
those regions and filter them into the temporal and spatial segments defined below. 
2.3.1 Twitter data acquisition 
We streamed Twitter data through the public Twitter Application Programming 
Interface (API) (https://developer.twitter.com) for the duration of the study. The API 
timestamps each Tweet as it is posted, and the Tweet and its attributes (e.g., text, user 
identifier, coordinates of the Tweet, etc.) are pushed in real time to a server in the lab, 
where the data is stored permanently. Following our Twitter collection during the 2017 
Atlantic Hurricane Season, we filtered those Tweets first for those geolocated in the 
southeastern United States and the Gulf of Mexico, and secondarily for the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas for each of the regions outlined above. Each instance of Tweet data 
includes the location of the Tweet in decimal degrees, the author, the time of posting, and 
the Tweet’s text content. For this analysis, we did not consider retweets, and we did not 
consider Tweets geolocated through the location-attribute designated in the originator’s 
profile. We additionally processed the Tweets’ texts to filter out bots using keywords we 
built through testing with OSoMe’s Botometer tool (Indiana University 2018) and spot-
checked the total dataset for location accuracy. 
It should be noted here that, with respect to Puerto Rico and Hurricane Maria, we 
unfortunately found an extremely and unusually high percentage of Tweets recorded post-
landfall that appeared to be falsely geolocated on the island. Due to the reported near-total 
decimation of the power and communications structure on the island likely reducing true 
posts and the extreme prevalence of incorrectly geotagged data associated with Puerto Rico 
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post-landfall (Pasch et al. 2019), the data for Hurricane Maria was ultimately not 
considered in the final analysis. The implications of this are explored further in the 
Discussion section.  
Following the text-based filtration, we processed approximately 1.1 million Tweets 
into the following temporal and spatial segments. 
2.3.2 Temporal segmentation 
Having identified our process for collecting relevantly located and produced data, we 
needed to define the time periods from which to draw data. Our stated goals required us to 
specifically analyze changes from steady state Twitter posting behavior to perturbed state 
Twitter posting behaviors. The perturbed state period was easiest to define: we considered 
the perturbed state to consist of the day before landfall and the week following landfall in 
order to encompass most of the ‘response’ and ‘recovery’ phases of the hurricane (Yang et 
al. 2013). In defining the beginning of the steady state, we wanted to avoid potential activity 
fluctuations that occurred in anticipation of hurricane damage in the preparedness phase. 
To do this, we allowed for a transitionary state that we defined as the day the hurricane was 
identified in the Atlantic until the day before landfall. As for the steady state’s duration, 
we followed the recommendations of Toepke, who identified that defining a reliable 
baseline for Twitter activity requires four to six weeks of data (Toepke 2018a). A greater 
time period could be influenced by the seasonality of Twitter usage, and a smaller time 
period would be more susceptible to influence from outliers. The flow of Twitter data has 
been shown to be steadily increasing from its founding through 2017, although its growth 
rate has since leveled off (Twitter 2018). Thus, to minimize the influence of outliers while 
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still generating a robust set of data, our steady state for each region thus consisted of the 
six-week period prior to when the affecting hurricane was identified in the Atlantic. 
With our broad-scale temporal states defined, we needed to assess the temporal 
scale at which we would perform our analysis within those states. Twitter data varies 
substantially throughout the day; there are substantially fewer Tweets at 3 a.m. than at 5 
p.m., and we needed to define steady states that could account for that quotidian variation 
while still amassing enough data to develop a consistent baseline. Although we 
accumulated data in hourly packages, the Twitter activity deviation for individual hours 
across the steady state was too high. After assessing the rate changes in Twitter activity 
during the steady state and accounting for changes across time zones, we ultimately defined 
six temporal categories into which we sorted our data. The data was classified as either 
“weekday” or “weekend”, then sorted into one of the following time windows: 12:00 a.m. 
to 7:59 a.m., 8:00 a.m. to 3:59 p.m., and 4:00 p.m. to 11:59 p.m. The six temporal categories 
are shown in Table 1. Data acquired during the steady state that was sorted into each of 
these six temporal categories were utilized to develop six steady state distributions, and the 
acquired perturbed state data were then compared to their respective steady state 
distribution. 
Table 1. Description of the temporal segmentation for the Twitter data. 
Day of the week 12am – 8am 8am – 4pm 4pm – 12pm 
Weekday 
(Mon – Fri) Category 1
 Category 2 Category 3 
Weekend 
(Sat – Sun) Category 4 Category 5 Category 6 
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2.3.3 Spatial segmentation 
Emergency responders have indicated a need for emergency location, severity, and 
magnitude information across the spatiotemporal breadth of the crisis (Mason et al. 2017). 
It is therefore important to be able to identify areas of great need on a fine resolution scale 
and to understand that need relative to the surrounding areas. However, with any 
aggregation of individual data points, the aggregation reduces the granularity and spatial 
accuracy of the data and increases the uncertainty and variability of the aggregation’s 
ability to represent the points it encompasses (Bian and Butler 1999). We had two 
determinations to make for our methods of aggregation: the size and the shape of our areas. 
Although census tract boundaries have accrued a long and storied history within any 
research field involving people, they have also accrued a substantial amount of criticism 
(Grubesic and Matisziw 2006). Census tracts vary widely in size and shape, ranging from 
less than 0.1 square kilometers (km2) to more than 800 km2, and are defined using socially-
influenced boundaries (Fotheringham and Wong 1991; Portnov et al. 2007). Inner cities 
have much smaller census tracts than broad rural areas, and the conflux of the modifiable 
areal unit problem and the geographic relationships of social vulnerability factors could 
heavily influence the results of an analysis with a prominent social aspect. Additionally, 
we should note that we were able to stretch beyond the limits of census tracts because we 
were not normalizing the collected Twitter activity by population but rather by historic 
Twitter activity. 
As such, we decided to generate uniform hexagons in which to spatially segment 
our data. Hexagons have been noted to preserve inherent spatial variations and neighboring 
relationships and to improve the scalability of the grid (Carr et al. 1992; Polisciuc et al. 
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2016; Shelton et al. 2014). In terms of the size of the hexagons, the greatest analytical 
concern was the potential tradeoff between location specificity and sufficient quantities of 
data. Potter et al. addressed this issue in the field of landscape ecology by comparing data 
resolution for different types of data at different scales (Potter et al. 2016). We slightly 
modified their methods of analyzing the how different hexagon sizes resulted in different 
distributions of event severity (in this case, the intensity of Twitter activity bursts or drop-
offs). We tested the sensitivity of 2, 5, 10, 20, and 35 km2 hexagons to determine the 
minimum size at which the majority of hexagon Twitter count totals were sufficiently large 
for the Central Limit Theorem to hold (n>30), at which the steady state data distributions 
had minimal kurtosis, and at which minor variations in scale did not have significant 
impacts on the number of identified extreme bursts or drop-offs. 
This research found that data bias was minimized and analytical significance 
preserved with an optimal study area of 5-15 km2. Thus, we chose to generate a grid of 10 
km2 polygons. The grid we generated to cover the study regions consisted of approximately 
10,000 individual hexagons. Of these, we removed those that did not contain any Twitter 
data during both the steady and perturbed states to reduce the potential for conflated 
significance in our results. Our final analysis, excluding Puerto Rico, contained nearly 
7,000 10 km2 hexagons. 
2.3.4 Twitter deviation analysis 
Upon the completion of our datasets of temporally and spatially segmented Tweet 
counts, we characterized the distributions of Twitter activity observed for each eight-hour 
segment for each hexagon across both the steady and perturbed states. Previous research 
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has determined that more original content is produced in areas strongly affected by a 
hurricane, and, as mentioned, bursts in Twitter activity during a hurricane are significantly 
correlated with damage (David et al. 2016; Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016). However, even if 
hurricane-related Tweets peak just after the hurricane peaks, the variability within small 
geographic areas (in terms of increasing or decreasing activity) has not been explored. We 
compare the differences in the distributions in Twitter activity counts from steady state to 
perturbed state to characterize the prevalence of both types of Twitter activity changes: 
increases, and decreases. 
Following our characterization of the Twitter activity in steady and perturbed state, 
we determined the deviation in Twitter activity from steady to perturbed state on a daily 
basis for each of the 7,000 hexagon in the study regions. The deviation in Twitter activity 
for each hexagon was defined using Equation 1, where 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎 represents the Twitter activity 
deviation, 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 represents the number of Tweets (activity) observed in a defined period in a 
hexagon within the perturbed state, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 represents the average number of Tweets observed 
in that area during the steady state, and 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 represents the standard deviation of the Tweet 
counts observed during the steady state. Finally, the deviations for each hexagon were 
summed across the disparate temporal categories to create daily deviation values for every 
day of the perturbed state. This process is visualized in Figure 3, which shows the 
hexagonal grid overlaying the Twitter data for a day of Houston, Texas’ steady state, the 
average number of Tweets within each of those hexagons, and the deviation in the number 







Finally, we had determined the standardized deviation 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎 in Twitter activity 
(defined here as the number of original content Twitter posts in a geographic area) from 
steady state to perturbed state (defined here as the period of time a region is heavily 
impacted by a hurricane) across a total of more than six weeks (as recommended in [Toepke 
2018] ) and 70,000 km2 of the southeastern United States.  
With this data, we first characterized the observed distributions of these deviations 
for each city to identify the relative prevalence of increases and decreases in Twitter 
activity. Next, to ascertain the relative importance of considering decreases as dangerous, 
we defined a metric that would rank decreases in activity as relatively unimportant (raw 
deviation, 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎) and one that would consider them as equally important as a comparative 
increase in activity (absolute deviation, |𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎|). The raw deviation encompasses the direction 
of the change in activity. When ranked from lowest to highest, the areas that experienced 
the greatest decrease in activity are lowest ranked, and the areas with the greatest bursts in 
activity are highest ranked. The absolute deviation encompasses only the magnitude of the 
change in activity. When ranked from lowest to highest, the areas that exhibited the least 
change in activity from steady state to perturbed state are lowest ranked, and those that 
exhibited the greatest amount of positive or negative change are highest ranked.  
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Figure 3. (Left) Houston, Texas overlaid with a white-lined grid composed of 10 km2 
hexagons. Blue dots are used to indicate the location of Tweets accumulated during one 
day of the steady state for the city. (Middle) The average daily Tweet counts for Houston, 
Texas across the steady state period. Darker red hexagons indicate higher average daily 
Tweet counts, while paler yellow hexagons indicate lower average daily Tweet counts. 
(Right) The absolute deviations in Twitter activity for Houston, Texas on August 27th, 
2017, Harvey’s second landfall. Darker red hexagons indicate higher amounts of change 
in Twitter activity from steady state averages, and paler yellow hexagons indicate lower 
amounts of change. 
2.3.5 Infrastructure damage validation 
Having defined the deviation metrics for analysis and gathered and segmented the 
Twitter data, we needed to assess the correlation between each metric and the hurricane 
damage that social media crisis applications seek to identify. To validate the relevance of 
Twitter activity deviation, we used FEMA Building Level Damage Assessments (referred 
to as FEMA Damage Assessments) as an infrastructural damage metric. The FEMA 
Damage Assessments were created as soon as was safely possible following the hurricane 
and are available as point shapefiles that represent buildings that have been classified as 
having “No Damage”, being “Affected”, having “Minor Damage”, having “Major 
Damage”, and being “Destroyed” (The Federal Emergency Management Agency 2016). 
We reinterpreted this range into a continuous numeric scale from 0, representing “No 
Damage”, to 4, representing “Destroyed”. This more subjective scale would represent the 
overall potential danger to a building’s inhabitants during the hurricane more judiciously 
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than a monetized scale, which might amplify damage to less vulnerable communities 
(Villegas et al. 2018).  
We used ArcGIS to determine a variety of statistics for the damage ratings assigned 
to buildings within each hexagon, including the count, average, and maximum. The FEMA 
Damage Assessment point data tended to be present in clusters of varying sizes across the 
cities. On further investigation, we found these clusters to have peak amounts of 
infrastructure damage at their centers and varying amounts of less-damaged infrastructure 
in the surrounding areas. For instance, in the immediate area surrounding each cluster of 
“Destroyed” buildings, there would be anywhere from five to one hundred buildings rated 
as having “Minor Damage” or having been “Affected”. Because of this, some areas with 
the same number of destroyed buildings would have substantially different average damage 
ratings, most often due to differences in neighborhood size. This would be a confounding 
factor in using the average. Also, as this research is primarily concerned with people in 
life-threatening danger, we determined that preserving the presence of “Destroyed” 
buildings in the infrastructural damage metric would be critical to the utilization of our 
findings. Thus, to mitigate the confounding effect of neighborhood size and to preserve the 
magnitude of extreme situations, we used the maximum damage rating within each 
hexagon instead of the average for our damage metric.  
2.3.6 Correlations between Twitter activity and damage 
To compare the relative correlations between each deviation metric and the 
infrastructural damage metric identified above, we utilized both Kendall and Spearman 
rank correlation tests (Kendall 1938; Sedgwick 2014). These two tests compare the 
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similarities in the order of the hexagons when ranked from lowest to highest deviation and 
when ranked from lowest to highest infrastructural damage. For the raw deviation, the 
hexagons were ordered from highest decrease in activity to highest increase in activity; for 
the absolute deviation, the hexagons were ordered from least amount of change in activity 
to greatest amount of activity change. It should be noted that we chose rank correlation 
tests because the FEMA Damage Assessment scale is both ordinal and non-continuous. 
Although there is a clear underlying variable that has been discretized, it would not be 
accurate to assume that the values are evenly spaced with respect to damage impact. For 
the final analysis, we determined the Kendall rank correlation coefficient 𝜏𝜏 and the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌 for both the raw and absolute Twitter activity 
deviation for each day of the perturbed state for each city. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Twitter Usage Characterization 
As described above, we first characterized the distributions of the number of 
Twitter posts for each eight-hour temporal segment (i.e., the Twitter activity within that 
period) for the steady states and the perturbed states. A violin plot of that activity, 
comparing the distributions of Twitter activity for both states for each city, is presented as 
Figure 4. Most of the distributions of steady state Twitter activity per eight-hour period 
appear to be bimodal, and the perturbed state distributions are more likely to have a single 
local maxima. Additionally, the perturbed state average and median values appear to be 
slightly lower than their steady state counterparts. It should be noted that the violin plots 
show only the central 95% of the data. As such, although the perturbed state values appear 
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to have a significantly smaller range than the steady state values, the more extreme 
perturbed state values were more likely to be categorized as outliers and not included. We 
still find that the range of Twitter counts is larger for the steady state than the perturbed 
state, reinforcing the need for a robust amount of data to define a steady state. This figure 
further demonstrates the differences in the number of Tweets produced per eight-hour 
period within each city: Houston, Texas and Miami, Florida consistently produce more 
than one thousand Tweets in an average eight-hour period, while a significant number of 
areas in both Biloxi, Mississippi and Beaumont, Texas produce fewer than ten.  
Following the recognition that the average Twitter activities of the perturbed state 
appeared to be generally lower than those of the steady state, we characterized the density 
of raw deviations in Twitter activity from the steady state to the perturbed state. The 
distribution of the deviations in Twitter activity observed for each hexagon for each day of 
the perturbed state are shown in Figure 5. The distributions of Twitter deviation have 
similar characteristics across the study regions. Each distribution is unimodal with a peak 
in Twitter activity deviations at approximately -0.2, a steep drop-off in density at 0, and a 
long, thin right tail. The long right tail is expected because the distribution is bounded to 
the left; an area’s activity level can only fall to zero, so each area’s deviation is bounded 
by its steady state average. On review of the data, the effect of the long right tail is 
especially evident for Houston, where the total number of Tweets peaks on August 26th 
and 27th; however, these two days also show the highest number of areas exhibiting overall 




Figure 4. Violin plot depicting the distributions of Twitter activity counts recorded across 
all of the eight-hour periods during the steady and perturbed states for each region of 
interest. The distributions of the steady states are depicted in blue, and the distributions of 
the perturbed state are depicted in yellow. The width of each violin depicts a greater density 
of values within that region, and the length of the violin represents the range of 95% of the 
data. Box plots are overlaid on each violin that depict the median as a black line down the 





Figure 5. Density plot depicting the distribution of deviation values recorded from all of 
the hexagons across all of the perturbed state (seven days) for each city. Negative values 
indicate hexagons that decreased in activity from the steady state to the perturbed state. 
The different colored areas indicate the different cities. 
The regions of negative deviations show higher overall densities, although the 
positive deviation regions have greater range. The lowest observed deviation in Twitter 
activity was -2.7, and the highest was 81.2. Miami shows the greatest spread, and 
Beaumont shows the least. This shows that very few regions did not change at all, the 
majority of areas decreased slightly in Twitter activity in the perturbed state, and a few 
outlier areas increased a drastic amount.  
2.4.2 Rank comparisons 
Following our characterization of the observed Twitter activity, we derived the 
Spearman and Kendall rank correlation coefficients for each day of the perturbed states for 
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1) the absolute Twitter activity deviation and the maximum recorded infrastructure damage 
within the hexagons, and 2) the raw Twitter activity deviation and the maximum recorded 
infrastructure damage within the hexagons. These values are presented in Table 2 and 
Table 3. We first focused on the correlation coefficients derived for the day on which the 
respective cities experienced the greatest amount of damage. For most cities, this day is 
landfall; however, Hurricane Harvey had a second landfall on August 27th that did more 
damage through flooding than its initial impact on August 25th. To reflect this, we use 
August 27th as the principal day of analysis for both Houston, Texas and Beaumont, Texas. 
The rank correlation coefficients for the deviations determined on the day of maximum 
damage are compared for each city in Figure 6. 
Spearman and Kendall rank correlation coefficients are shown by the circle markers 
at the end of each line of the lollipop chart, marked with an “S” or “K” respectively. Blue 
markers and lines indicate the result of the rank correlation test between infrastructural 
damage and the absolute Twitter activity deviation, and yellow markers and lines indicate 
the result for the correlation between infrastructural damage and the raw Twitter activity 
deviation. Hollow markers indicate that the derived rank correlation coefficient for that test 
was statistically insignificant (p>0.05). The cities are ordered chronologically by hurricane 




Figure 6. Lollipop chart comparing the rank correlation coefficients for the raw and 
absolute Twitter deviations across study regions on the day the regions experienced the 
most infrastructure damage according to recorded rainfall and wind conditions and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reports. Kendall’s τ is 
depicted with a circle containing a “K” and Spearman’s ρ is depicted with a circle 
containing an “S”. The values for the raw deviation depicted in yellow, and those for the 
absolute deviation are depicted in blue. Values that were statistically significant (p<0.05) 
are shown with filled circles, while those that were statistically insignificant (p>0.05) are 
shown with hollow circles. 
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Table 2. Spearman rank correlation coefficients between social media deviation metrics and infrastructure damage across the 
perturbed state. 
       Spearman’s 𝝆𝝆 
Day Harvey Irma Nate 
Houston Beaumont Florida Keys Miami Fort Myers Tampa Jacksonville Biloxi Mobile 
Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw 
Day -1 0.1* -0.06* 0 0.03 0.39* -0.26* 0.07 -0.1* 0.14* -0.17* -0.01 -0.09* 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.2* -0.1* 
Day 0 0.07* -0.05* 0 0.06 0.32* -0.31* 0.1* -0.12* 0.15* -0.14* -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.18* -0.17* 0.16* -0.08 
Day 1 0.07* -0.05* 0.05 0.01 0.37* -0.29* 0.13* -0.12* 0.16* -0.22* 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.13* -0.02 0.08 -0.05 
Day 2 0.12* 0.08* 0.25* -0.07 0.35* -0.23* 0.06 -0.07 0.13* -0.18* 0.03 -0.09* 0.03 0.01 0.16* -0.11 0.16* -0.08 
Day 3 0.1* 0.06* 0.07 0.01 0.38* -0.28* 0.13* -0.12* 0.16* -0.21* -0.01 -0.06* 0.06 -0.08* 0.15* -0.11 0.14* -0.08 
Day 4 0.12* 0.05* 0.07 0.09 0.36* -0.29* 0.08* -0.08* 0.12* -0.24* 0.04 -0.08* 0.06 -0.04 0.15* -0.02 0.15* -0.03 
Day 5 0.11* -0.03 0.04 0.09 0.38* -0.29* 0.11* -0.11* 0.13* -0.15* 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.08 0 0.15* -0.07 
Day 6 0.12* -0.02 0.09 0.11* 0.42* -0.35* 0.13* -0.11* 0.11* -0.12* 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.17* 0.13* -0.05 
 * indicates p < 0.05 
 
Table 3. Kendall rank correlation coefficients between social media deviation metrics and infrastructure damage across the perturbed 
state. 
     Kendall’s 𝝉𝝉 
Day 
Harvey Irma Nate 
Houston Beaumont Florida Keys  Houston Beaumont Florida Keys  Houston 
Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw Absolute Raw 
Day -1 0.08* -0.04* 0 0.03 0.31* -0.21* 0.06 -0.08* 0.1* -0.13* -0.01 -0.07* 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.15* -0.08* 
Day 0 0.05* -0.04* 0 0.05 0.26* -0.25* 0.07* -0.09* 0.12* -0.11* -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.14* -0.13* 0.13* -0.06 
Day 1 0.05* -0.03* 0.04 0.01 0.3* -0.23* 0.1* -0.09* 0.12* -0.17* 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.1* -0.02 0.06 -0.04 
Day 2 0.09* 0.06* 0.2* -0.06 0.28* -0.19* 0.05 -0.06 0.1* -0.14* 0.03 -0.07* 0.03 0.01 0.12* -0.08 0.13* -0.06 
Day 3 0.08* 0.04* 0.05 0.01 0.31* -0.23* 0.1* -0.1* 0.13* -0.17* -0.01 -0.05* 0.05 -0.06* 0.11* -0.08 0.11* -0.07 
Day 4 0.09* 0.04* 0.05 0.07 0.29* -0.24* 0.06* -0.06* 0.09* -0.18* 0.03 -0.06* 0.05 -0.03 0.11* -0.02 0.12* -0.02 
Day 5 0.08* -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.31* -0.23* 0.09* -0.09* 0.11* -0.12* 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.06 0 0.11* -0.05 
Day 6 0.09* -0.02 0.07 0.08* 0.34* -0.28* 0.1* -0.09* 0.08* -0.09* 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.13* 0.1* -0.04 




The data show that, when the cities are hit by peak infrastructural damage, the 
absolute Twitter activity deviation in Twitter activity consistently has a stronger, 
significant correlation with that infrastructural damage than the raw deviation. Seven of the 
nine impacted cities show a significant correlation between the absolute Twitter activity 
deviation and the amount of destruction wrought by the hurricane, and the other two cities 
do not exhibit a significant relationship between either the raw or absolute Twitter activity 
deviation. Additionally, for Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Nate, the strength of the 
correlation between absolute Twitter activity and infrastructural damage decreases with 
increasing geographic and temporal distance from each storm’s first landfall. This is 
particularly evident in the strength of the correlation for the Florida Keys, hit first and 
hardest, as compared to that of Tampa and Jacksonville, which were hit a full day later and 
are more inland. 
Additionally, we see an inverse relationship between the absolute and raw Twitter 
activity deviations for many of the cities. The correlation strengths are not perfectly 
inverse, although, as would be expected, the absolute deviation tends to be much stronger 
when the difference between the absolute and raw is greater. This is particularly true for 
cities impacted by Hurricane Irma. Houston, Texas, Tampa, Florida, and Jacksonville, 
Florida are the only cities for which the two deviation (raw and absolute) metrics are 
directly related, and the correlations for both sets of metrics are statistically insignificant 
for the latter two cities. The two cities for which the correlation between infrastructure 
damage and absolute Twitter activity deviation is significant while the raw deviation is not 
are Mobile, Alabama and Beaumont, Texas: both comparatively smaller cities. 
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Looking beyond landfall towards urban recovery, we turned our attention to the 
duration of the correlations’ significance. In comparing the correlations across time, we 
analyzed the rank correlation coefficients of the absolute and raw Twitter activity 
coefficients with infrastructure damage for each day of the week following landfall. The 
results of that analysis for Houston, Texas are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Lollipop chart comparing the rank correlation coefficients for the raw and 
absolute Twitter deviations observed in Houston, Texas across the days of the perturbed 
state. Kendall’s τ is depicted with a circle containing a “K” and Spearman’s ρ is depicted 
with a circle containing an “S”. The values for the raw deviation depicted in yellow, and 
those for the absolute deviation are depicted in blue. Values that were statistically 
significant (p<0.05) are shown with filled circles, while those that were statistically 
insignificant (p>0.05) are shown with hollow circles. 
As the trends are not uniform across each of the cities, we have divided our 
description of the results by the hurricane that impacted each city. 
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2.4.3 Hurricane Harvey (Aug 24-Aug 31) 
Similar to the results observed by Kryvasheyeu et al., there is a weak but significant 
correlation between incoming infrastructural damage and Twitter usage behaviors as early 
as the day before landfall, although not prior to that (Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016). This 
correlation decreases on the date of landfall, then rises for both metrics on the day of 
greatest observed damage. A key difference between the raw and absolute deviation 
correlation coefficients, however, is that the raw deviation drops following its peak on the 
day of Harvey’s second landfall, and the absolute deviation maintains both its strength and 
its statistical significance for five days following its peak. 
For Beaumont, however, instead of a weak to moderate correlation strength for the 
absolute deviation in Twitter activity across the duration of the perturbed period, the only 
significant correlation was one of moderate strength on the day of peak infrastructural 
damage. All other days had insignificant correlations, and all correlations with the raw 
Twitter activity deviation were insignificant.  
2.4.4 Hurricane Irma (Sept 9-Sept 17) 
We observed similar short-term trends in the cities affected by Hurricane Irma. The 
Florida Keys’ absolute Twitter activity deviation correlation is the strongest by far among 
the cities, and it is significant and moderately strong across the duration of the perturbed 
state. This contrasts with Miami and Fort Myers, which have correlation strengths that peak 
after landfall and then slowly decrease in strength. The correlation between raw Twitter 
activity deviation and infrastructure damage is negative for each of these three cities and is 
not significant across the duration of the perturbed state following landfall. The two 
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northernmost cities, Tampa and Jacksonville, have insignificant correlation coefficients 
across much of the perturbed state. Jacksonville exhibits insignificant correlations for both 
raw and absolute Twitter activity deviations; however, in direct contrast to the other cities, 
Tampa exhibits significant correlations only for raw Twitter activity deviations. 
2.4.5 Hurricane Nate  (Oct 8-Oct 15) 
The absolute Twitter activity deviation observed in Biloxi, Mississippi and Mobile, 
Alabama are significantly correlated with infrastructure damage for landfall and for at least 
four of the days following landfall. The absolute Twitter deviations exhibit correlation 
strengths that peak on landfall and then slowly decrease in strength. The correlation 
strengths of the two cities are fairly similar to each other and follow similar trends across 
the perturbed state. 
2.5 Discussion 
First, in our characterization of Twitter activity changes, we see that Twitter activity 
during a hurricane decreases in most local geographic areas. This indicates the presence of 
Simpson’s Paradox within the data: a few super-users Tweeting excessively result in an 
overall increase in Twitter activity, despite more individual areas showing a decrease in 
activity. Because we see non-uniform/non-random changes in Twitter activity, these results 
additionally show that we cannot universally characterize an area’s “Tweeting population” 
(number of users who are active Tweeters) during a crisis by its Tweeting population out 
of crisis. Our data reinforces the necessity of using a variety of historical contextualization 
metrics to define the applicable scope of social media data in crisis applications. As has 
been called for in the literature (Chen et al. 2013) and, as we have shown, utilizing 
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historical Twitter activity data to develop a steady state is one worthwhile 
contextualization. We are working with less data from most locales during a crisis, and we 
need to factor that into our data processing. Exactly why less data is produced and the 
significance of geographic clusters of activity increases and decreases still need to be 
explored. 
In testing the importance of this missing data through our methodology, we show 
that seven of nine cities showed that the absolute deviation metric had a stronger, more 
positive, statistically significant correlation with damage as compared to the raw deviation 
on the day of maximum experienced damage. This soundly confirms H1: sharp social 
media decreases are more likely to be signals for increased infrastructural damage than an 
absence of danger. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; indeed, in this case, 
the opposite is more likely. 
It should be noted that the correlation strength values we identify are slightly lower 
than those found in previous literature (0.1-0.35 instead of 0.2-0.65, as in Kryvaysheu et 
al. [2016]). The decreased strength could be due to the decreased geographic scales of 
analysis; the eliminated confounding (and potentially strengthening) influence of using 
ZCTAs; or the method of standardizing the data to a steady state. As we focus on the direct 
comparison between the absolute (|𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎|) and raw (𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎) Twitter activity deviations to identify 
the relative importance of drop-offs in danger identification, we believe our conclusions 
still hold strong. 
As described above, seven of nine cities confirmed H1 for data produced on the 
day of maximum damage; six cities showed this trend to be consistent throughout the 
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duration of the perturbed state. Of the three cities which did not, two of them showed no 
significant correlation between either raw or absolute Twitter activity deviation on more 
than one day of the perturbed state. These results are likely a combination of variances in 
the demographic composition of the cities themselves and the strengths of the hurricanes. 
For instance, Houston and Beaumont, Texas are geographically close; Harvey struck both 
with a similar strength. However, Beaumont had fewer “destroyed” FEMA Damage 
Assessments and fewer FEMA Damage Assessments overall per household (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2016). This could be because Houston was drowning beneath the overflow from 
Buffalo Bayou (Nyaupane et al. 2018), and Beaumont—which is tangential to an inlet 
water body instead of surrounding one—was not so heavily inundated. Beaumont also had 
one of the lowest steady state Twitter distributions, which may have contributed 
substantially to the lack of significant correlations. From the comparison of these two cities, 
we theorize that there is a direct relationship between hurricane damage and the relative 
strength of our “silence” metric. This is also echoed in literature on Hurricane Sandy: the 
area of New York that had the most deaths was also relatively social media silent (Shelton 
et al. 2014). If social media silence becomes more significant with increasing hurricane 
damage, and if hurricane damage is expected to increase (Gall et al. 2011), then this implies 
an increasing need to consider the impacts of the silence we identify. 
In considering the impacts, we need to consider cause and prevention. Which of the 
drop-offs are due to failures in urban resilience, and which due solely to intentional human 
behavior choices? Interrupted network access could have been caused by power outages 
combined with a lack of access through a paid mobile network or through lack of access to 
external networks. It should be noted that many lower socioeconomic groups rely on 
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internet access through external networks, such as Starbucks, instead of at-home networks 
(Khan et al. 2016). As noted by Zou et al., vulnerable populations contribute comparatively 
less to social media streams than less vulnerable populations during a disaster (Zou et al. 
2018). A disparity in internet access during a hurricane could contribute to a disparity in 
the ability of vulnerable populations to Tweet and thus inequity in the un-contextualized 
usage of social media data in crisis applications. Our research currently cannot show 
whether a decrease in Twitter activity is due to specific, intentional posting choices or 
infrastructure failures, and the subject should be explored in future work. All posting 
intentions equal, if higher socioeconomic have a higher likelihood of maintaining internet 
access than lower socioeconomic groups, and if crisis applications contribute more 
resources to regions on the premise of Tweet bursts or key word identification, vulnerable 
populations may receive an inequitably low proportion of social media-directed resources. 
As the crisis informatics community continues to evolve, and as emergency 
responders are increasingly monitoring social media during a crisis (Murthy and Gross 
2017), this consideration of how well the existing data represents different populations will 
be critical to equity. Areas with higher vulnerability scores have already been shown to be 
more poorly served by existing emergency response services like hurricane evacuation 
(Bian and Wilmot 2017); are we making this disparity worse? The existing methods 
advising social media tools are currently blind to the needs of people unable to Tweet 
during a disaster due to immediate personal danger or failures in energy infrastructure. The 
possible oversight of these populations advocates the need for social media analyses that 
are capable of detecting their need. Particularly as recent research into vulnerable 
populations has shown that the poorest populations—and poorest countries—are going to 
 41 
be hit first and hardest by the effects of climate change (Schiermeier 2018), the way we 
process information needs to be at least peripherally aware of the differences in digital 
capabilities between the poor and the affluent; the areas of a city with poorly maintained 
infrastructure and those with resilient buildings; and those residents prepared for an 
incoming disaster and those taken entirely unawares. 
2.5.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
With respect to our method of using Twitter activity deviation instead of spikes, a 
potential flaw is that the decrease in activity primarily indicates areas that people have 
evacuated, or commercial sectors of the city that have closed in anticipation of danger. We 
attempted to alleviate this risk by removing hexagons without Tweets in both the steady 
and perturbed states. On review of the spatial correlation of our data, the distribution of 
hexagons that increased and decreased in Twitter activity does not appear to be consistent 
with county evacuation zones. With respect to the problem of reduced mobility to 
commercial sectors, our use of a scalable hexagonal grid should minimize the partitioning 
of our study area by residential and commercial sectors that would have been a factor in 
using ZCTAs. Although evacuation is surely a factor in some of the wide-scale decreases 
in Twitter activity, we note that neither Houston nor Beaumont, TX issued comprehensive 
evacuation orders. A mobility study using cell phone data identified an approximate 5% 
decrease in unique users on the Texas coast (Marzuoli and Liu 2019); even with this minor 
decrease, both cities match our conclusions. Of course, future research needs to consider 
how and where to apply the described “silence” metric to account for both silence and 
evacuation. The effect of broad-scale, enforced evacuation on the deviation correlation 
should be identified and accounted for.  
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Tangential to that, we note that very little true information was produced through 
Twitter during Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico; the damage threshold at which the form 
of humans-as-sensors data changes is important to consider. With an area in complete 
social media silence, little can be done with our approach. Multiple datastreams and data 
approaches will be necessary to increase the robustness of our crisis informatics 
applications. 
From an analytical perspective, our usage of 10 km2 hexagons was primarily based 
on summary statistics, recommendations from the field of critical GIS, and experience with 
the detriments of the modifiable areal unit problem in census tracts (Jelinski and Wu 1996; 
Saib et al. 2014). Future research needs to focus on determining at what spatial and 
temporal scales the identified relationship is strongest, and at which spatiotemporal scales 
the relationship breaks down.  
Future work will broadly need to determine when our “silence” metric should be 
more rigorously utilized. Our research showed that there were several hurricanes for which 
it was an indisputably stronger metric for damage, and two for which it was entirely 
insignificant. As stated earlier, we need more research to understand if the presence or 
absence of “silence” is linked to disaster severity, infrastructural resilience, disaster 
preparedness, vulnerable populations, or something else entirely. Following that more 
theoretical work, additional research should also explore how to incorporate “silence” from 





Our initial characterization showed the existence of sample bias created when a 
region transitions from a normal state to a crisis state. Following that, in testing H1, we 
show that the sample bias introduced by this transition is significant, and that failing to 
recognize social media drop-offs could put people—possibly the most vulnerable people—
at risk. By analyzing social media activity deviations and recognizing social media drop-
offs, we show that a metric that prioritizes drop-offs is more highly correlated with 
infrastructure damage than one that ignores them. Not every social media user can or will 
contribute to the humans-as-sensors datastream during a crisis, and, as is explicitly shown 
here, the social media data shadows generated by this behavior could hide disaster. 
Crisis informatics is continually developing new methods of incorporating social 
media into crisis response, and we are applying it to everything from event detection to 
resource distributions. However, one weakness of these methods is the exclusive focus on 
only the data produced during a crisis situation. These methods neglect to consider 
populations that are suddenly unwilling or unable to Tweet and have dropped out of the 
social media data stream. Within this paper, we test for the prevalence of social media 
drop-offs and test whether sudden social media silence in an area could be an indicator of 
a crisis situation. We find that most geographic areas, when assessed at uniform size and 
shape, decrease in Twitter activity during a hurricane. For the latter, we find that greater 
Twitter activity drop-offs are significantly correlated with more infrastructure damage, not 
less. The importance of recognizing and including social media “silence” is consistent 
across seven of nine cities impacted during the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season.  
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Ultimately, our research shows that social media data shadows are more likely to 
be hiding people in danger, not less. To use humans-as-sensors data in the most equitable 
and actionable way, crisis researchers need to consider both the sound and silence of the 
Tweets. 
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CHAPTER 3. TIPPING THE SCALES: HOW ANALYTICAL 
SCALE AFFECTS THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
BEHAVIOR IN CRISIS RESEARCH  
3.1 Abstract 
Our relationship with technology is constantly evolving, and how we use 
technology in disasters has evolved even faster. Understanding how to utilize human 
interactions with technology and the limitations of those interactions will be a crucial 
building block to contextualizing crisis data.  The impact of geographic scale on behavioral 
change analyses is an unexplored facet of our ability to identify relative severities of crisis 
situations, magnitudes of localized crises, and total durations of disaster impacts.  Within 
this paper, we aggregate Twitter and hurricane damage data across a wide range of 
geographic scales and assess the impact of increasing scale on both the recognition of 
extreme behaviors and the correlation between activity and damage. The power-law 
relationships identified between many of these variables indicates a direct, definable scalar 
dependence of social media aggregation analyses, and these relationships can be used to 
inform more intelligent, equitable, and actionable social media usage in emergency 
response.  
3.2 Background 
As the supply of data from humans-as-sensors continues to increase, understanding 
individual data streams in the context of our multi-layered and multi-networked society is 
becoming more difficult.   Social media is increasingly looked to as a potential source of 
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additional information in the notoriously information-scarce environment of crises (Reuter 
and Kaufhold 2018). The crisis informatics field has continued to flourish and expand 
alongside the seemingly ever-increasing quantities of available social media data and 
methods of analyzing that data. As a result, the applications for social media during crises 
has expanded to include event detection (Sakaki et al. 2010), resource availability and need 
(Choe et al. 2017), and mobility monitoring (Wang and Taylor 2016a).  Analytical methods 
range from sieving individual posts for information (Ashktorab et al. 2014), to analyzing 
geographic changes in sentiment and behavior for informing gestalt-level decisions 
(Jongman et al. 2015; Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016). 
The big data revolution has clearly opened a vast area of possibilities for crisis 
response (Qadir et al. 2016).  One of the greatest strengths of the field is the diversity it 
contains, and the range of techniques available for the processing of this ever-increasing 
and changing pool of data. Applications from the field are being used by international aid 
organizations (Imran et al. 2014), and strides are being made for local response 
implementations of social media analysis as well (Tapia and Moore 2014).  That said, the 
range of diversity of applications and methods can also impede the process of building a 
solid foundation.  Researchers both external and internal to crisis informatics have noted 
criticism of social media applications’ limits with respect to data bias, social inequality, 
and lack of confirmed validity (Imran et al. 2015; Jiang 2018). 
More data is available; however, big data is not complete data.  There has been a 
consistent call for us to critically interrogate the assumptions and capabilities of big data 
in the context of our political and urban usage (Boyd and Crawford 2012).  As the reach 
and amount of available data increase, holes in that data become both less obvious due to 
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the existing volume and yet more harmful due to the increasing prevalence of that data’s 
use (Morstatter and Liu 2017).  Social media, especially when used for crisis response, is 
not exempt from this call. This is especially true in the case of crisis response, where 
information availability alone can tip the scales of resource distribution. To ensure more 
equitable and intelligent use of social media data in crisis response, researchers need to 
understand the social, spatial, and sociospatial limitations of that data.  One critical piece 
of that understanding is understanding the geographic scale at which social media data is 
capable of identifying disasters, and how much information is gained or lost by varying 
that geographic scale. 
Geographic scale is less important in analyses sifting through individual posts, but 
it becomes more relevant when determining the likelihood of each of those posts appearing 
in a specific place and time. Spatiotemporally-aggregated data can be key to identifying an 
expected baseline level of activity (Toepke 2018a); identifying the proportions of a 
population that Tweet (Mislove et al. 2011); identifying drop-offs in activity alongside 
spikes in activity (Samuels et al. 2018a); and ultimately providing a social lens through 
which the social benefits or ramifications can be, at a minimum, glimpsed (Shelton et al. 
2015).   
Aggregate behaviors in real-time can be used to analyze relative disaster severity 
and magnitude. As is often echoed, disasters are not disasters because of high wind speeds 
or unprecedented amounts of flooding; disaster are disasters because of how they interrupt 
and, sometimes, forever change a society’s functions.  Disasters are inherently social and, 
ultimately, defined by societal vulnerabilities. The impacts and vulnerabilities associated 
with a disaster need to be defined in multiple dimensions, with an emphasis on social norm 
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disruptions (Guan and Chen 2014). Spatiotemporal aggregation, then, can give us the pre- 
and post-impact phase reference points called for by Guan and Chen (2014).   
However, we currently lack understanding of the scale at which to generate these 
reference points. Previous research, particularly focusing on social disruptions, has 
identified the existence of a scalar dependence on the correlation between hurricane 
damage and Twitter activity fluctuations (Shelton et al. 2014), but did not further 
investigate it. Subsequent calls for further research highlight how understanding the scalar 
dependencies of social media data will improve our reference for the data’s place in 
geographic, temporal, and social space (Jessop et al. 2008), thus improving our total 
understanding of the social significance of Twitter activity trends. 
Lastly, a massive disaster such as a hurricane or an earthquake is composed of 
hundreds of small ones: flooded neighborhoods, downed overhead power transmission 
lines, and trees thrown through roofs by gale-force winds (Wurman and Kosiba 2018).  
These disasters happen to more than individuals, but less than the whole of society.  
Disasters of varying magnitude can happen to small neighborhoods, along vast swathes of 
a river, or through power outages across a city. If a 911 call can recognize a disaster 
happening to an individual, at what scale can social media recognize and triage 
emergencies affecting more than individuals? Is it limited to disasters occurring to 
thousands of people, or can it also identify disasters affecting smaller groups? The more 
we understand the capacity of humans-as-sensors to identify the location, relative severity, 
and magnitude of the localized disaster, the more useful social media will be to emergency 
response (Raue et al. 2013).  Understanding how scale impacts the recognition of behavior 
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will also enable us to reduce the obfuscation of any minority behaviors occurring at small 
scales that are drowned out by those happening at larger ones (Chen et al. 2013). 
Within this paper, we analyze and present the scalar dependencies of aggregate 
social media analyses. We focus primarily on the ability of social media to identify 
localized disasters, i.e., to distinguish groups or areas that are being impacted by the 
disaster more extremely than the broad geographic region.  The connection between social 
media activity and the presence of extreme danger or disaster has been noted in several 
pieces of literature (Guan and Chen 2014; Kryvasheyeu et al. 2015), and we are specifically 
testing the scalar dependencies of that connection.  In order to do this, we test at different 
scales 1) the ability of Twitter to identify distinct clusters of similar behavior, 2) how much 
behavior is identified as non-normal or extreme during a disaster, and 3) how the strength 
of the correlation between Twitter activity and hurricane damage varies.  Understanding 
the shape of the relationships between these three factors and changing scale will improve 
our understanding of how to maximize the benefits of decreasing scale (more specificity 
of place) while minimizing the costs (less confidence in correlations).  These assessments 
are codified in the following hypotheses: 
H1.  The distribution of changes in social media behavior and the identification of 
behavioral clusters is statistically different at smaller scales. 
In order to assess this hypothesis, we qualitatively investigated the statistical 
distribution of Twitter representation (Tweets per person) across the Houston Metropolitan 
Area using each of the spatial nets. We secondarily quantitatively investigated the scale at 
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which the distributions of Twitter representation cannot be statistically distinguished 
between increasing spatial aggregation scales for both steady and perturbed state days. 
Provided that some aspects of Twitter behavior are scale dependent, we should be 
able to use the dependency to identify how scale affects crisis-relevant analyses.  Most of 
social media crisis analyses operate on the assumption that humans affected by crisis will 
change their behavior, and increasing amounts of evidence show that hurricanes produce 
localized crises at a small scale (Lieberman-Cribbin et al. 2017; Wurman and Kosiba 
2018). In order to be useful to crisis managers who need specific and localized information, 
we should understand the smallest scale at which in-crisis behavior changes are 
identifiable, and the potential information value trade-offs of decreasing or increasing the 
scale of analysis. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2. The identification of crisis-induced, extremely high or extremely low amounts 
of non-normal Twitter activity is scale-dependent. 
For this second hypothesis, we quantitatively assess the percentages of areas that 
have deviated from their steady state norms during Hurricane Harvey.  The assumption of 
crisis informatics is that disasters break the ability of society to function normally (Guan 
and Chen 2014). How social media identifies and codifies those breaks in normal 
functioning is important to understand for trying to identify small-scale crises in a sea of 
larger crises. We also need to understand if the aforementioned connection between social 
media activity and hurricane damage is more or less consistent for identifying those small-
scale crises. This leads us to our third hypothesis: 
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H3. The strength of the correlation between Twitter activity and infrastructural 
damage is scale-dependent. 
For this, we test previously-identified correlations between Twitter activity 
deviations and records of hurricane damage at increasing spatial scales.  Knowing how 
scale affects correlation strength, and therefore affects how confident we can be that 
activity is indicative of a disaster, is important for communicating with emergency 
managers. 
These quantitative comparisons of the representative capabilities of aggregation 
techniques will also inform future tools and algorithms that seek a real-time metric for 
human need expressed through social media.  To address these hypotheses, we chose to 
focus our efforts on the city of Houston, Texas circa Hurricane Harvey.  As the largest city 
on the Gulf Coast of the US (“Houston, Texas Population 2018” 2018), Houston had a 
large hurricane-affected population that, based on our analysis of Gulf-based city Tweeting 
behavior, also has a substantial number of affected Twitter-users. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Twitter Data 
All of the geolocated Twitter data for the greater metropolitan area of Houston for 
seven weeks prior to and one week following Hurricane Harvey's landfall were streamed 
through the Twitter API (Wang and Taylor 2016b).  Hurricane Harvey made its first 
landfall in Houston on August 25th in the evening; the hurricane then pivoted and returned 
on August 27th to deposit torrential, record-breaking rains.  For our analysis, we defined 
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our perturbed state—the period of time during which non-normal behavior would be 
expected—as one day prior to the first landfall through the week following landfall (August 
24th-September 1st).  To identify non-normal behavior, we needed to select a steady state 
to act as our baseline for “normal” behavior.  We defined this steady state as the five-week 
period from July 11th and August 16th, following prior research describing the time period 
length necessary to generate a sufficiently stable analysis (Toepke 2018a); a longer period 
would increase the influence of both seasonality and population flux. The steady state 
behavior has a left-leaning log normal distribution, matching prior findings, and is explored 
more in Figure 8. We also allowed for a transitionary state, during which the hurricane 
would broadly impact Twitter posting behavior through anticipation of harm but not 
through actual hurricane damages or events. This state is defined as the period from the 
day Harvey was identified as a tropical storm through the day before our perturbed state 
begins (August 17th-August 23rd). 
With respect to important dates, it should be noted that Houston experienced the 
most infrastructural damage and flooding on August 27th and not when Hurricane Harvey 
first made landfall.  As such, many of the following analyses focus on behaviors identified 
on August 27th. 
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The sets of steady state and perturbed state Tweets were temporally aggregated by 
day, transformed into individual points through ArcGIS, and plotted using their latitude 
and longitude attribute information in ArcGIS.   The Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) 
and 2010 census tract shapefiles were downloaded from the Harris County GIS data portal 
(Harris County, 2019).   
3.3.2 Population Data 
The census data and census tracts are not at a sufficiently fine resolution to enable 
understanding of the nuances of neighborhood-scale behavior during a crisis.  The tracts 
further from the city center can be as large as 1500 km2, so we need to find a method of 
increasing the resolution of the population data. The geographic information science (GIS) 
field has historically utilized National Land Cover Database (NLCD) data to increase the 
granularity of census data with substantial accuracy (Reibel and Agrawal 2007).  The 
NLCD contains a raster file with 30 meters (m) by 30 m cells that have been classified, 
through satellite imagery, as one of 16 classes.  The classification includes four classes of 
developed land: open space, low intensity, medium intensity, and high intensity. These 
Figure 8. The steady state distributions of 5 random areas within the 50 km2 areas spatial 
net (left) and the 1 km2 areas spatial net (right).   
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classifications are determined using the amount of water-permeable and water-
impermeable land; thus, the “open space” designation does not necessarily describe areas 
with no people, but rather areas with a relatively smaller (<20%) amount of concrete-
covered land, like suburbs. The raster cells from the 2011 dataset that were classified as 
“developed” were extracted and clipped to the greater metropolitan Houston Area.  Using 
ArcGIS' Raster to Point function, each of the raster cells were transformed into points 
located at the center of each cell and spatially joined by count into the census tracts for 
Houston.  Using the counts of each type of NLCD class and the population record for each 
census tract, a multiple linear regression analysis was performed to determine the expected 
contribution of each type of land type to the tract’s population. The model is presented as 
Eq. 2.   
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖 
(2) 
In Eq. 2, Popt is the population for a given census tract t; OpenAreat is the number 
of NLCD cells described as “Open Space (Developed)” within the census tract; LowIntt is 
the number of cells described as “Low Intensity (Developed)” within the tract; MedIntt is 
the number of cells described as “Medium Intensity (Developed)”; and HighIntt is the 
number described as “High Intensity (Developed)”. The results of the regression analysis 
are presented in Table 4. The model has an adjusted R-squared of 0.8317 and a model p-
value of <0.001.  
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Table 4. Multiple linear regression results for the NLCD land class types and the census 
data. 
NLCD Class Model Coefficient STD Error p-value 
Re-scaled 
Coefficient 
Open area 0.30 0.03 <0.001*** 0.23 
Low intensity 0.11 0.07 0.123 0.19 
Medium intensity 4.50 0.10 <0.001*** 0.58 
High intensity -2.34 0.12 <0.001*** 0.01 
The model coefficients were used to determine the weighted averages of each land 
type within each census tract.  As shown, the areas of very intense development have a 
substantial and significant negative contribution to the residential population of the 
Houston census tracts.  Bian and Wilmot encountered similar results in New Orleans, 
Louisiana in a study using the same technique to study disadvantaged populations impacted 
by Hurricane Katrina (Bian and Wilmot 2017). Following ground proofing techniques, they 
assigned a positive but very small assigned coefficient to the highly developed areas of the 
city.  Following their example for the purposes of the population disaggregation, we 
determined the ratio of each model coefficient to the coefficient range (-2.34 to 4.50) and 
used this scaled ratio as the re-scaled coefficient. This process ensured a match between 
the census data population and the population assigned within each tract such that the 
disaggregation would be at least as accurate. It also preserved the ratio of the magnitude of 
impact between categories.  
The assigned coefficients were employed as weighted averages in Eq. 3 to 








  (3) 
In Eq. 3, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  is the population represented by a single 30mx30m NLCD raster 
cell point of NLCD type i within a specific census tract; the NLCD types of “Open area”, 
“Low intensity”, “Medium intensity”, and “High intensity” are represented as i→l; WAi is 
the weighted average for the specific land type; WAi→l is the sum of the weighted averages 
for each land type; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is the total population within the census tract in which the 
point is located; and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the total number of points of type i within the specific 
census tract.  The resulting dataset was a grid of point files spaced 30 m apart that could be 
aggregated into equal-area, uniform areas with less structural bias than census tracts. 
Although the accuracy of this method cannot be accounted for at a 30mx30m scale, the 
regression results and the rescaling of the coefficients lend the assurance of reasonable 
accuracy for larger-scale aggregation. 
3.4 Spatial Nets 
A common method of aggregation, particularly when social factors are considered, 
is to use census tracts or ZCTAs (Grubesic and Matisziw 2006). Although this gives 
arguably the most accurate nighttime population of the aggregated areas, their boundaries 
can be of widely varying shapes and sizes, and their jurisdictions are strongly influenced 
by the boundaries of socially-biased fragmentations.  These social factors and can 
contribute data bias, and the size and shape differences can contribute to the Modifiable 
Area Unit Problem (MAUP) (Grubesic and Matisziw 2006; Jelinski and Wu 1996).  As 
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such, we chose to create our own spatial nets of varying scales and to include the ZCTA 
boundaries for comparison. 
With the social media data temporally aggregated and mapped and the population 
data spatially disaggregated, we designed twelve spatial nets to catch the population data 
and the Twitter stream for each day.  These spatial nets are composed of a series of 
interlocking shapefiles that cover the greater Houston area.  One of these nets consists of 
the Houston ZCTA zones; the others were composed of uniformly shaped, tiled hexagons.  
As many of the problems identified with using manmade boundaries for spatial aggregation 
are related to their varying sizes and shapes, we wanted to develop a spatial net design that 
could be deployed across a large area, regardless of country of interest, and could be scaled 
according to the intended research design.  This has the advantage over ZCTAs, which 
vary in size and shape. The ZCTAs within Houston alone, for instance, range in size from 
0.16 square kilometers (km2) to 677.20 km2.  
We generated the spatial nets of equally sized and shaped hexagonal polygons 
through ArcGIS’ Generate Tessellation function.  Hexagons are better suited for tiling large 
geospatial areas because they reduce edge effects that can be exacerbated by intersecting 
rectangles and are more scalable on a curved surface like the globe (Carr et al. 1992; 
Polisciuc et al. 2016).  The twelve hexagonal nets consist of hexagons that have square 
areas of, respectively, 0.25 km2, 0.5 km2, 0.75km2, 1 km2, 2 km2, 5 km2, 10 km2, 15 km2, 
20 km2, 35 km2, 50 km2, and 80 km2.  These areas were chosen following the guidelines 
listed in the Spatial Association of Scalable Hexagons described by Potter et al., which 
suggests choosing sizes that closely mimic the behavior that is being studied or the 
sampling size, or the spatial dependence of the data. As such, these sizes mimic the range 
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of sizes of Houston census tracts and the spatial spread of the Twitter data. With respect to 
the upper limit of 80 km2, we determined from the stated interests of emergency 
management personnel that information on areas larger than that scale provided very little 
actionable or useful information in terms of aid distribution or the presence of local 
disasters.  A comparison between the 1km2 and 80km2 nets is shown in Figure 9 for a 
scalar reference. 
We summed the number of Twitter posts for each day and the population values of 
each of the NLCD points within each polygon of each net.  Following the methods listed 
Kryvasheyeu et al. (2016), polygons that did not contain at least one Tweet per day during 
either the steady state or perturbed state were removed. For validation purposes with 
respect to the hurricane damage, we additionally plotted the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency building level damage assessments (FEMA damage assessments) 
collected in the days following Hurricane Harvey.  These assessments are geolocated and 
the buildings they reference are classified as “Affected”, “Minorly Affected”, “Majorly 
Affected”, and “Destroyed”.  We converted this ordinal scale of damage into a numerical 
ordinal scale, for which “Affected” is classified as a “1” and “Destroyed” is classified as a 
“4”.  For each polygon of each net, we additionally calculated the total number of damage 
assessments performed and the maximum and average assigned damage value of the 
polygons.   
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Figure 9. (Left) Spatial net consisting of 1 km2 hexagons across Houston. (Right) Spatial 
net consisting of 80 km2 hexagons across Houston. 
3.4.1 Analytical Methods 
H1. The distribution of changes in social media behavior and the identification of 
behavioral clusters is statistically different at smaller scales. 
In order to identify the scalar interval of aggregation at which the distribution of 
Tweets per person changes significantly, we created empirical cumulative density 
functions (CDFs) of the Twitter activity per person for each net on a daily basis. These 
intra-net CDFs consisted of all of the Twitter representation values identified on a single 
day in all of the polygons of the net. We produced thirteen CDFs for five days of the steady 
state and for each day of the perturbed state.  We then used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov II 
test on each pair of CDFs to test the likelihood that the CDFs were produced from the same 
parent distribution (Massey 1951).   
H2. The identification of crisis-induced, extremely high or extremely low amounts 
of Twitter activity is scale-dependent. 
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In order to understand the distribution of perturbed state Twitter posting counts that 
were either much higher or much lower than the “normal” behavior observed in the steady 
state, we used cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) to compare perturbed state Twitter 
activity to the steady state Twitter activity.  We used the steady state post counts for each 
of the spatial nets to generate a series of CDFs. These CDFs represented the distribution of 
Twitter activity for a single area across each day of the steady state period.  For instance, 
for a given area A within the 10 km2 net, we created a CDF from all of area A’s steady 
state Twitter activity counts by day. We then took the perturbed state Twitter activity on a 
given day, such as August 27th, and used the generated steady state CDF of activity to 
determine what percentage of steady state days had produced less than the number of 
Twitter posts produced on August 27th in area A. A result of 0.90 would indicate that the 
perturbed state activity on August 27th was higher than the activity produced on 90% of the 
days in the steady state, and a result of 0.10 would indicate that the perturbed state activity 
was only higher than 10% of days in the steady state.  
 We used each CDF to assess, for each area and each day of the perturbed state, the 
cumulative likelihood of observing a certain number of Tweets in that area on that day. We 
categorized this likelihood as being normal, non-normal, or extreme. Although, as stated, 
we are most interested in extreme values, we included an analysis of non-normal to provide 
a reference for the impact of how the threshold of “extreme” amounts of activity is defined. 
Using empirical rule values, non-normal social media behavior was defined as being less 
than 16% of steady state values or greater than 84% of steady state values.  Extreme social 
media behavior was defined as being less than 5% of steady state values or greater than 
95% of steady state values.  To identify the effect of scale on observing extreme (and non-
 61 
normal) values and so understand the prevalence and significance of activity bursts, 
clustering, or drop-offs, we took the distribution of the likelihood of observing the 
perturbed state Twitter activity and analyzed the distributions of those probabilities across 
nets and days of the perturbed state.   
H3. The strength of the correlation between Twitter activity and social media is 
scale-dependent. 
Finally, to assess how scalar aggregation affects the previously identified 
correlation between non-normal Twitter activity and hurricane damage, we applied the 
statistical test for Kendall’s rank coefficient to the Twitter activity per person within each 
area and the average FEMA building level assessment designation recorded within each 
area (“Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient” 2008).  These values were determined on a 
daily basis and compared across spatial nets. 
3.5 Results 
H1. The distribution of changes in social media behavior and the identification of 
behavioral clusters is statistically different at smaller scales. 
The comparisons of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov II test results are depicted in Figure 
10a-d.  The null hypothesis for the test is that the two populations are drawn from the same 
population.  With larger p-values (distribution pairs with p-values greater than 0.05 are 
displayed as gray squares), the less certain we are that we can reject the null hypothesis 
The test statistic for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov II test is the D-value, which is representative 
of the greatest distance between the two tested distributions. The D statistic is larger when 
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the statistical difference between the two CDFs is greater, and is represented by a more teal 
than purple hue.   
The top two figures show the results of two days of the steady state, August 7th and 
August 8th, and the bottom two figures show the results of two days of the perturbed state, 
August 26th and August 27th.  It should be noted that the CDF and statistical test results for 
the census tracts are on the outermost edge of the figures, and those results, interestingly, 
are not equivalent to either the very small nets or the very large ones.  Across each set of 
tests, the larger nets’ distributions are more similar to each other, and nets that are more 
similar to each other in size also have more similar distributions.  Apart from those trends, 
both of the steady state graphs show the significant decrease in the certainty that the spatial 
nets’ CDFs are from different distributions between 5 km2 and 2 km2.  This pattern of 2-5 
km2 spatial trends breaks during the perturbed state, in which small-scale areas begin to 
behave more similarly to each other.  This opened window in the smaller spatial scales 
exists from August 26th through September 1st, although it diminishes in size beyond 




Figure 10a-d. Comparison of the likelihood that the spatial nets have different daily 
distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov II test.  The census tracts net is represented 
in the furthest left column and bottom row.  The top two figures were created from steady 
state values (August 8th and August 12th), and the bottom two figures were created from 
perturbed state values (August 26th and August 27th).  The black arrows indicate the first 
pair of nets, by increasing scale, that are statistically distinct from the next smallest net.  
The purple arrows indicate pockets of statistically indistinct distributions at the 0.5 - 1 km2 
scale that appear in the perturbed state. 
H2. The identification of crisis-induced, extremely high or extremely low amounts 
of Twitter activity is scale-dependent. 
In order to understand the distribution of perturbed state values that were either 
much higher or much lower than the “normal” social media behavior observed in the steady 
state, we used CDFs to compare perturbed state values to the steady state values.  For 
instance, for a given area A, within the 10 km2 net, we created a CDF from all of that area’s 
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steady state values. We then took the perturbed state Twitter activity on a given day and 
used the CDF to determine what percentage of steady state values were lower than that 
perturbed state value. A value of 0.90 would indicate that the perturbed state value was 
higher than 90% of the steady state values.  We then looked at the distribution of those 
probabilities to identify the effect on scale on the prevalence of extreme or non-normal 
values.  First, we looked at the distribution of these probabilities graphically. The densities 
of the intra-net daily CDFs for the spatial nets for 0.25 km2, 1 km2, 5 km2, and 35 km2 are 
portrayed in Figure 11a-d.   Figure 11a and b show bimodal distributions, with increased 
numbers of areas displaying extremely low and high amounts social media engagement.  
Figure 11c, representing the 5 km2 spatial net, has a less ordered bimodal distribution, with 
less consistency across days, and Figure 11d (35 km2) does not exhibit a bimodal 
distribution, and is remarkably disorderly.  The peak density values also decrease with 
increasing spatial net size. 
Following a qualitative assessment of distribution, we quantitatively assessed the 
percentage of values on the day of maximum rainfall and damage, August 27th, that 
exhibited non-normal or extreme social media behavior.  Non-normal behavior was defined 
as being one standard deviation from the mean, i.e, less than 16% of steady state values or 
greater than 84% of steady state values.  Extreme social media behavior was defined as 
being less than 2.5% of steady state values or greater than 97.5% of steady state values. 
We additionally included the percentage of areas that exhibited normal Twitter activity, 




Figure 11a-d. Comparison of the densities of extreme and non-normal social media 
behavior for four spatial nets (0.25 km2, 1 km2, 5 km2, and 35 km2). The colors represent 
different days of the perturbed state, and peaks closer to 0 or 1.0 indicate values that are 
either lower or higher than most of the values observed in the region’s steady state. 
The percentage of areas identified with each of those kinds of social media 
interactions compared to the size of the spatial nets are compared in Figure 12 and Figure 
13.  To define the relationships between each set of variables, we used the method of 
maximum likelihood to estimate a scaling exponent for a power law relationsship. A power 
law relationship is defined as 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥β; with this data, 𝑥𝑥 represents the geographic 
scale, and 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) indicates the predicted variable (i.e., the percent of areas with extremely 
high or low numbers of Tweets, the correlation coefficient between Tweets and FEMA 
damage ratings, or the percentage of geographic area excluded from analysis), and 𝛼𝛼 and 
𝛽𝛽 are constants (Stumpf and Porter 2012). The minimum 𝑥𝑥 value (geographic scale) was 






of the estimated parameters for these relationships were assessed using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (Clauset et al. 2007). Although there are too few data points to more positively 
confirm the presence of a power law relationship, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics 
show that the data distributions for each of the tested relationships could be derived from 
a power law distribution. Vuong’s test was used to compare the relative distance between 
the sample distributions, the estimated power law distributions, and log-normal 
distributions estimated from the same data (Vuong 1989). The estimated power law scaling 
exponents, the minimum 𝑥𝑥 values, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results, and the Vuong test results are presented in Table 5. 
Of most importance for applications, the relationship between increasing 
geographic scale and the identification of extremely low social media interaction is 
negative, while the relationship between scale and the identification of extremely high 
social media interaction is positive.  The minimum value for which this relationship holds 
true has not been identified.  The scaling constants, 𝛼𝛼, vary between 0.1 and 1.0, but the 
magnitudes of the power 𝛽𝛽 is approximately the same  for both of the equations for the 
extreme values. Additionally, the inclusion of non-normal activity analysis was provided 
as a reference for the impact of the threshold at which the amount of activity could be 
interpreted as “extreme”. We see the impact of increasing the boundary for the 
classification from outside the central 68% to outside of the central 95% in the 





Figure 12. Comparison of the percentages of areas exhibiting non-normal or extremely 
low Twitter activity behavior between spatial nets, fit to power law distributions. 
  
Figure 13. Comparison of the percentages of areas exhibiting non-normal or extremely high 
Twitter activity behavior between spatial nets, fit to power law distributions.   
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Decreasing the threshold at which an observed behavior is classified as noteworthy 
obviously increases the number of noteworthy observations; however, this effect is slightly 
larger for the extremely high values, and the effect is more profound at higher scales 
(greater than 40 km2). 
At a gestalt level, the difference between the percentage of areas identified as 
exhibiting extreme at the smaller scales is much larger (approximately 80% for scales less 
than 0.5 km2) than the percentage identified at the larger scales (approximately 53%). This 
relationship is represented in Figure 14. The geographic coverage of those areas, however, 
is quite similar due to the increased removal of areas without Twitter activity at the smaller 
scale. 
H3. The strength of the correlation between Twitter activity and social media is 
scale-dependent. 
The relationship between scalar aggregation and the strength of the correlation 
between Twitter activity on August 27th and hurricane damage is presented in Figure 15.  
Figure 14. The relationship between the percentage of the total study area (the 
greater metropolitan area of Houston) excluded from the analysis on account of not 
having sufficient Twitter activity, as defined in Section 2.3, and the geographic scale 
at which the data was aggregated. 
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This data also shows a direct proportionality between the scale of aggregation and the 
strength of human social media behavior signals in the analysis.  It should be noted that 
each value is significant except for that of the 35 km2 net, which was excluded from the 
model fitting due to its lack of statistical significance (p = 0.11) .  The correlation strength 
increases sharply until the 10 km2 scalar aggregation with no apparent sacrifice of statistical 
significance.  
 
Figure 15. Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient strength between Twitter Activity per 








Table 5. Results of the maximum likelihood estimation of sample distribution fit to power laws. 
 
Variable 𝜷𝜷 𝒙𝒙𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 Exponent K-S test  Vuong's test  








0.18 0.16* Log-normal more likely 
Extremely low activity 0.18 250m 0.17 0.17* Equally likely 
% of area removed  0.58 250m -0.32 0.16* Power law more likely 
Correlation with damage 0.07 500m 0.25 0.16* Equally likely 
*Indicates that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic's null hypothesis (that the sample distribution was drawn 
from a power law distribution) could not be rejected at p<0.05. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
First and foremost, the analyses presented herein show that the stories our data tell 
differ when read at different scales.  With any scalar analysis, we would expect more 
variation at smaller scales across time and between areas.  There is an expected tradeoff 
between certainty at large scales and specificity at small scales.  The crisis community has 
recognized this; however, the effect of scale on the ability of social media to (H1) identify 
distinct clusters of geographic social media interaction changes, (H2) identify non-normal 
or extreme social media behaviors, and (H3) provide statistical confidence that social 
media behavior changes indicate danger had not been explored. Within our three analyses, 
we have identified the precise relationship between scale and social media signal behavior 
in the hopes of making the crisis informatics community more aware of how scale can 
influence multiple facets of the findings of social media analytics. 
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In addressing H1, the steady distribution of Twitter activity observed within spatial 
nets of an area greater than 10 km2 is not statistically different from the distribution 
observed in another spatial net greater than 10 km2.  The inverse is also true; nets smaller 
than 5 km2 are not as likely to be from the same distribution as each other. This confirms 
the existence of social and place-related social norms occurring at scales smaller than 5 
km2; i.e., in the broader scheme of human activity, most locations and events occupy a 
geographic space smaller than 5 km2, so smaller scale analyses incorporate different slices 
of these different locations and events. At the 10 km2 scale, the highs and lows of activity 
are averaged across more data, minimizing the impact of the grouped extremes.  Even at 
the 0.25 km2 scale, the analysis identifies different slices of life from the 0.5 km2 scale. 
This clear cut-off of statistical difference disappears during a crisis state, however.  
People within 0.5 – 2 km2 begin behaving in more similar ways, and, during the day of 
maximum rainfall and damage, the difference between the distributions at most of the 
smaller scales decreases substantially. This confirms research showing hurricanes 
impacting cities differently at small scales due to small vortices and flooding susceptibility. 
It is likely that this sudden homogenizing of social media behavior at the 0.5 – 2 km2 is 
indicative of the average effect of distinct, human-impacting hurricane phenomena.  This 
similarity of social media behaviors at smaller scales than usual may also be indicative of 
reduced population mobility or infrastructure limitations. 
With respect to our second hypothesis, the percentage of extreme social media 
behavior in a crisis state and the strength of the correlation between extreme behavior and 
hurricane damage are both definably dependent on geographic scale.  We identify and 
define the effect of geographic scale on the identification of extreme social media 
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behaviors, and we show clearly that the effect is different for different extreme behaviors. 
When we assessed the distribution of the likelihood of seeing each value in the perturbed 
state using the empirical cumulative distribution function generated in the steady state, we 
found that the smallest scales are likely to define the majority of active areas as either very 
low or very high. Few perturbed state values lie close to the average of the steady state. If 
the purpose of social media analysis is to identify areas with higher or lower severity, this 
indiscriminate binning of most values as “extreme” would not be ideal.  The consistency 
across the perturbed state does, however, note a reliably consistent categorization of 
specific areas into extremes.  This is the inverse of the social media behavior observed at 
the larger spatial scales, which has a wide variety of probabilities of the occurrence of 
values, and yet varies drastically from day to day of the perturbed state.   
The effect of geographic scale on variability in data distributions is reinforced by 
the relationships between aggregation scale and the number of identified non-normal and 
extreme events. In our data, we have identified six possible power law distributions, 
although three of them are more likely to truly be drawn from a power law distribution than 
the others.  Power law distributions have attracted a large amount of attention in almost 
every field, ranging from microbiology to economics.  They have been suggested as being 
present in nearly every natural system, although the statistical confirmation of the reality 
of each claim has been questioned (Stumpf and Porter 2012). The key feature of a power 
law relationship is that it is independent of scale: the relationship between the two variables 
is constant (although that relationship must often be restricted by a minimum value of the 
independent variable). This scale-invariance can be seen to indicate an intrinsic 
characteristic of the system.  
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In the realm of social behavior and social networks, power law relationships have 
been shown to develop due to growth and preferential attachment (Barabási and Albert 
1999). The prevalence of those two features in human networks has contributed to the 
identification of many social power law relationships, such as the famous “rich-get-richer” 
phenomenon noted by Pareto, who was one of the pioneers of power law identification 
(Newman 2005). The flux of people into urban centers can easily account for growth, and 
preferential attachment can be seen in how social media-using demographics more 
commonly flock to urban centers with similar types of people (Shelton et al. 2015).  
Recent work has identified additional power law relationships between the 
population size of city centers and the number of different types of Tweets generated within 
(Fan et al. 2020). Those results, which stem from the number of people in specific cities, 
and our results, which stem from the number of people within geographic scales, seem to 
indicate that growth and preferential attachment are present in the relative spatial clustering 
of those who want and are able to use social media more during a disaster. Because of these 
qualities, despite continuous growth in urban populations and social media users, the 
network of users specifically using social media during a disaster is organizing itself into 
a scale-free clustered network. This phenomenon may affect the relative ability of areas 
with greater numbers of social media users to receive more resources during a disaster 
purely due to the concentration of their voices. 
It should be noted, however, that a scale-free stationary state is difficult to prove 
(Forman 2007). Criticisms of abundant labelling of power law dynamics require statistical 
tests that our data cannot satisfy, i.e., independent and dependent variables that range more 
than two orders of magnitude each (Stumpf and Porter 2012). Additionally, many statistical 
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tests for the goodness of fit of power law distributions for binned data additionally require 
a longer tail than our data provides (Virkar and Clauset 2014).  With the limited discrete 
data obtained in this study, we are unable to determine with certainty the existence of power 
law relationships. We have followed the statistical suggestions put forward by fervent 
critics of the search for power laws (Clauset et al. 2007; Forman 2007) as well as we could. 
For two of our defined relationships, we cannot show through Vuong’s test that a power 
law distribution better describes our data than a log-normal or exponential distribution. 
Because of this uncertainty, the results of this study should be limited to the highest xmin 
determined through minimization of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic (500m) and the 
maximum scale we utilized (80km). 
We can at least say with certainty that the number of identified extremely low 
events decreases exponentially with increasing scale, and the number of identified 
extremely high events increases exponentially with increasing scale. This increased 
identification of non-normal social media interaction at increased scales suggests the need 
to apply more stringent thresholds for activity marked as abnormally or extremely high at 
larger spatial scales.  That said, the many decreased values identified at the smaller scale 
call for more stringent methods of investigation into these areas that are suddenly silent. 
In terms of sudden silence, previous research has identified that drop-offs in Twitter 
activity are also correlated with damage and theorized that those drop-offs are caused by 
social vulnerabilities more than social media behavioral choices (Samuels et al. 2018b).  
Increased scales minimize the potential for a social media analysis to identify these drop-
offs as extreme events, a factor that needs to be considered and addressed in social media 
applications.   
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In applying these to future analyses, we also show the influence of the MAUP on 
the use of ZCTAs in crisis informatics.  ZCTAs vary widely in size and shape; the ones 
within Houston, for instance, range in size from 0.16 km2 to 677.20 km2. This variance in 
size and socially constrained boundaries have been substantially critiqued in the field of 
critical GIS (Jelinski and Wu 1996; Saib et al. 2014). Across all analyses, the distributions 
appear closest to the values for the 5 km2 net. As the average size of the census tracts for 
the area is approximately 7 km2, this suggests that the potential spatial biases of census 
tracts in terms of Twitter representation may be more directly related to the tracts’ 
geographic size and less their socially-constructed boundaries.  The variances in the sizes 
of the ZCTAs is an additional variable that, as we have shown, has a significant effect on 
the analytical results of an analysis. 
As for the third hypothesis, concerning the relationship between these extreme 
values and hurricane damage, there have been multiple remarks in the literature regarding 
an expected relationship.  Shelton et al. (2014) identified a discrepancy in correlation 
values at varying scales, noting the apparent necessity of including scale as a factor in any 
analysis comparing Twitter activity and hurricane damage.  County-scale and state-scale 
correlations have found to be moderately strong (Guan and Chen 2014; Kryvasheyeu et al. 
2016; Shelton et al. 2014); however, each author notes the influence of scale on their 
analyses.  Guan and Chen hypothesize that “moving upward on the scale is likely 
associated with a larger amount of disruptions at a higher level of severity”, which would 
lead to a stronger, more significant “disaster” signal.  Within our analysis, we are able to 
show the likelihood of a power law relationship between increasing analytical scale and 
the strength of the correlation between damage and Twitter activity.  This relationship 
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shows that we can be more confident in social media activity behaviors indicating a local 
hazard when we look at larger spatial scales.  
In our data, we have identified six potential power law distributions.  Power law 
distributions have attracted a large amount of attention in almost every field, ranging from 
microbiology to economics.  They are nearly ubiquitous in natural systems, although the 
statistical confirmation of the reality of each claim has been questioned (Stumpf and Porter 
2012). It is no small irony to the authors that their identification of the scale-dependence 
of social media analyses culminates in a distribution defined as scale-independent. We 
would like to note, then, that the relationship between scale of aggregation and these 
Twitter behaviors is what is scale-independent; the relationship itself is direct and 
significant.   
The significance of the power law relationship itself identified between these 
variables is less certain.  Criticisms of abundant labelling of power law dynamics require 
statistical tests that our data cannot satisfy, i.e., independent and dependent variables that 
range more than two orders of magnitude each (Stumpf and Porter 2012).  Statistical tests 
for the goodness of fit of power law distributions for binned data additionally require a 
longer tail than our data provides (Virkar and Clauset 2014).  Ultimately, whether these 
relationships are power law or logarithmically distributed, we see an exponential or as-
good-as increase in the correlation between Twitter activity and hurricane damage.  The 
certainty involved in whether extreme social media behaviors function as good indicators 
of hurricane damage is scale-dependent, showing once again that the tradeoff for 
geographic specificity is certainty of the identification of hurricane damage, and analyses 
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performed at the census tract or county level need to incorporate the analysis scale into 
their explanations of their findings.   
3.6.1 Limitations and Future Work 
NLCD data. Although one of the first uses of NLCD data was to estimate 
populations distributions on a fine scale, and despite its storied history in population 
estimation, it is still a fallible metric.  Despite the good fit of our initial regression model, 
the negative coefficients produced required additional model tweaking that undoubtedly 
caused further data bias. Additionally, census data is limited to the “nighttime” population, 
i.e., where people sleep (home). Based on the Tweet text, we find that most people stayed 
home during the worst of the hurricane, and thus this nighttime population may double as 
hurricane-time population. We were incapable of incorporating evacuation dynamics for 
the hurricane, but evacuation orders were issued too little and too late for Houston. 
Evacuation likely had less impact on population dynamics for Houston than for areas more 
often affected by hurricanes. 
Hurricane-specific Tweeting. Many studies in the field filter for Tweets that are 
directly related to the hurricane through text analysis. This limits the application of steady 
state versus perturbed state analysis, as no one was Tweeting about Hurricane Harvey 
before it formed in the Gulf.  We additionally wanted to incorporate areas Tweeting in a 
“business-as-usual” fashion during the hurricane.  As such, using hurricane/disaster-
specific Tweets was not possible, and our analysis undoubtedly incorporated some Twitter 
bots (Yang et al. 2019). We manually filtered some of the bots based on keywords (i.e., 
“jobs”, “FloodWatch”) determined through manual application of the OSoMe tool 
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BotOrNot (Indiana University 2018).  Furthermore, as the bots are likely unaffected by the 
hurricane, their activity changes would be normalized to zero, thus minimizing their effect 
on our analyses.  Further research is necessary into the influence of Twitter bots on the 
Twitter distributions and analyses specific to disasters. 
Area exclusion. We excluded from analysis all areas that did not have a single 
Tweet across the steady state period or a single Tweet across the perturbed state.  However, 
this resulted in a substantial amount of geographic coverage reduction in the smaller scales.  
We identified a logarithmic increase in excluded area with decreasing scale. For example, 
66% of Houston was excluded in the 0.25 km2 net, 53% was excluded from the 1 km2 net, 
and only 20% was excluded from the 20 km2 net. Further research is necessary to 
investigate the effects of Twitter activity thresholds, population thresholds, and the effect 
of including or excluding areas and populations with a very lower Twitter representation.  
This information will help inform how applicable Twitter data can be to demographically-
different neighborhood distinctions in social media behavior and will minimize the 
inclusion of non-participating, unrepresented populations.  
Lastly, no two disasters are the same, either in terms of the damage caused or in 
terms of the affected society.  The generalizability of the potential power law relationships 
and the distributions of Twitter activity to other cities and other disasters should be 
investigated. 
3.7 Conclusion 
There will never be an answer to, “What is the best scale at which to perform crisis 
informatics analyses?” just as there is no answer for, “At what scale are societies affected 
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by disasters?”  We hope, however, to have provided a roadmap for crisis informatics 
researchers using social media to better understand how the chosen scale of their analysis 
will affect their results.  Many of the potential power law relationships identified in this 
paper indicate an exponential tradeoff between the geographic specificity of smaller scales 
and the statistical certainty that an identified social media behavior represents an 
endangered population. Crises within a disaster context happen to individuals and 
communities; it is important to work towards using social media data to improve our ability 
to correctly assess the severity and magnitude of an identified emergency. Both of those 
factors depend on geographic scale relative to the surrounding areas and that area’s own 
history.  How we ascertain and contextualize our data, then, is heavily influenced by how 
we structure our analysis, and we need to be wary of what dependencies might be tipping 
the scales 
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CHAPTER 4. DEEPENING THE DIVIDE: CRISES 
DISPROPORTIONATELY SILENCE VULNERABLE 
POPULATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA2 
4.1 Abstract 
In the past decade, crisis informatics has sought to produce and use actionable 
information from social media data. Although substantial progress has been made in 
discerning how the data can be used, there is a lack of research in identifying possible 
inequities in that use. Previous research has shown that vulnerable populations use social 
media less in a disaster; however, the extent to which this social media usage disparity is 
predictable and the magnitude of that disparity have not been explored. This paper 
compares the covariance in Twitter activity and social vulnerability factors during a steady 
state period pre-hurricane and the perturbed state period following Hurricane Harvey’s 
landfall. These models show that sociodemographic vulnerability factors are better in 
predicting Twitter activity during a crisis than infrastructural damage, that 
sociodemographic factors negatively influence Twitter activity, and that this phenomenon 
is strengthened by a crisis. The crisis-specific negative covariance indicates the need for 
increased consideration of vulnerability factors in social media data-driven management of 
urban resilience and resource distribution. 
 
2 This chapter has been accepted for publication by the ASCE Journal of Management in 
Engineering with Dr. John E. Taylor as the co-author. The citation for the journal article is as follows: 
Samuels, R. and Taylor, J.E. (2020). “Deepening the Divide: Crises Disproportionately Silence Vulnerable 





As new and varied forms of information become available to researchers during 
crises, there has been a substantial push towards finding ways of applying that information 
to emergency responder priorities on the ground and at higher levels of decision-making.  
More people than ever are living in areas susceptible to catastrophic disasters because of 
urban sprawl (Allen 2006) and increased extreme weather patterns from climate change 
(Adachi et al. 2017).  As such, our ability to effectively and accurately utilize all forms of 
available information will be critical to reducing loss of human life and increasing the 
resilience of our cities.  While worsening extreme events are becoming more of a certainty 
than a possibility (Hauer et al. 2016), the extent of the impact on humans and society can 
be mitigated through improved resource planning and resource agility. These can be 
improved through increased real-time information on human location, activity, and in situ 
capabilities (Roshan et al. 2016).  Ultimately, more efficient distribution of our resources 
will depend on what is known about the people caught in the path of these extreme events. 
One source of data on human social media behavior and the on-the-ground 
information is the data generated through human interaction with communication 
networks. Social media has been found to offer new angles of study for individuals’ 
thoughts and sentiments across broad ranges of applications, from the construction industry 
to crisis resilience (Reuter and Kaufhold 2018; Tang et al. 2017). Data sources such as 
Twitter (Spence et al. 2015), FourSquare (Aubrecht et al. 2017), and cellular data (Jennex 
2012) are particularly useful as they each can have unique user identifiers, a location 
attribute, and a topical attribute, such as the text of a Tweet or the type of store someone 
has visited. The incorporation of user-volunteered information has been useful for tracking 
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individuals’ mobility and the influence of a disaster on that mobility (Wang et al., 2017), 
the change of individuals’ sentiment in response to different disaster impact levels (Wang 
and Taylor, 2018), and to identify infrastructure service disruptions using social media data 
mid-disaster (Fan and Mostafavi 2019). Research using spatiotemporal aggregation to 
compare two spatial datasets has shown that bursts of social media behavior and disaster-
related posts can indicate areas of relatively higher hurricane damage (Kryvasheyeu et al. 
2016) and the location of flooding (de Albuquerque et al. 2015). Looking forward, user-
volunteered information has been proposed for use in digital twin city frameworks for 
assessing infrastructural vulnerabilities, thus improving disaster resilience and 
preparedness (Xu et al. 2016), and for improving the situational awareness of emergency 
responders using the digital twin through integrated text, image, and geopositioning 
analysis (Fan et al. 2020). 
As compelling as these findings are, big data research has often been critiqued for 
overlooking human variability and for mistaking big data for complete data (Blumenstock 
2018; Gandomi and Haider 2015).  These two fallacies can also be found intertwined in 
some aspects of existing crisis informatics, as one of the critical dilemmas with humans-
as-sensors analyses is that humans are not reliable sensors.  Humans do not transmit 
consistent, coordinated, or comparable information through public data channels that can 
be continuously accessed by connected emergency responders or data analysts.  The rush 
to utilize information produced by humans-as-sensors in disasters has neglected to 
incorporate the diversity of human response and capabilities, impairing proper 
management and stewardship of that information.  
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Data bias in analyses involving Twitter data has been found in both the sample 
population (available Tweets) and the algorithms that have been constructed to parse the 
Twitter information (Johnson et al. 2017). The types of Tweets that are most used by 
researchers—those with a geotag—contain an additional set of biases based around the 
types of people that intentionally choose to use a geotag (Malik et al. 2015), further 
muddying the waters. Perhaps most concerningly, in terms of population bias, one study 
found that 50% of deaths from Hurricane Sandy occurred in an area with a complete lack 
of Twitter activity (Shelton et al. 2014). Another study focused on Hurricane Harvey found 
that some areas’ decreases in Twitter activity during a hurricane correlate as strongly with 
damage as others areas’ increases (Samuels et al. 2018a).  Researchers do not currently 
understand what factors could contribute to some populations being represented by social 
media in an emergency while others simply disappear; however, recent research has 
suggested that part of the disappearance could be due to sociodemographic vulnerability 
and the digital divide (Xiao et al. 2015; Zou et al. 2019). 
The absence of social media data from vulnerable populations is concerning on two 
fronts. First, viable and relevant information during a crisis is already in scarce supply, so 
areas with more information available about the severity of damage are easier and safer 
targets for resource distribution. In this possible “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” 
situation, vulnerable populations not contributing to this information stream could receive 
fewer resources as a result of their lack of data presence. Second, there has been a recent 
push for emergency information dissemination through social media platforms 
(Panagiotopoulos et al. 2016; Takahashi et al. 2015). If vulnerable factions are not 
contributing to social media because they are not using it, then they could also be missing 
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the chance to obtain critical crisis information.  It is clear that the decreased presence of 
vulnerable populations on social media needs to be accounted for in crisis informatics; 
however, it is not clear how.   
The digital divide has been defined as the inequality between “those who have and 
do not have access to computers and the Internet” (van Dijk 2006). People in lower 
socioeconomic groups and those associated with vulnerability factors, such as the elderly, 
are noted to be less likely to have higher levels of internet access and usage (Rogers 2001). 
If this divide is ascertainable, quantifiable, and able to be delineated prior to a crisis 
situation, the lack of information coming from these populations can be factored into the 
usage of social media. Ultimately, if it can be measured, it can be mitigated. However, 
previous research has only focused on the presence of the digital divide at large scales 
during and after a crisis situation (Shelton et al. 2014; Xiao et al. 2015; Zou et al. 2019). 
The relationship between the severity of the divide prior to the identification of a crisis 
(i.e., prior to the planning period), during the crisis, and beyond the crisis has not been 
explored. It is possible that a crisis situation introduces new factors that cannot be 
accounted for in a pre-crisis assessment of social media usage and yet significantly deepen 
the divide. For instance, lower socioeconomic groups are more likely to lose internet access 
due to power loss, as internet usage by people in a lower income brackets is often facilitated 
by free Wi-Fi hotspots located at places of employment or cafes (Khan et al. 2016).  During 
a disaster, those hotspots are no longer available due to closures or travel impedances.  
Because of this, the built environment and resilient infrastructure could be a critical 
piece of how the digital divide could widen during a disaster. The digital divide, as 
currently defined in disaster research, focuses on those who do not have access to 
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technology in their day-to-day lives. Disaster-induced infrastructural failures could impose 
technology-access restrictions on vulnerable populations unaffected during normal 
conditions. Previous work has shown that infrastructure service disruptions caused by a 
disaster have a diffuse and strong societal impact, and work is being done to delineate risk 
hotspots prior to disasters (Esmalian et al. 2019). Energy infrastructure, critical to 
communications networks, are significantly impacted by natural disasters in ways that are 
still being quantified (Ilbeigi and Dilkina 2018). The uncertainty involved in how crises 
affect the connection between vulnerable populations and the usage of communication 
technology is a potential sociocultural “hidden risk” for crisis informatics (Dae Kim 2017). 
Understanding how the digital divide is affected by a severe crisis situation, and 
thus how social factors influence individuals’ interactions with technologies in a disaster, 
is critical to understanding endangered populations’ social media representation (Blank 
2017).  As cities become smarter and more people become more connected to technology, 
defining the technological data signal from vulnerable populations, especially in disasters, 
is necessary for understanding what populations could be left behind in our future cities.  
This research’s objective is to identify how a major crisis affects the relationship between 
vulnerability factors and the prevalence of Twitter activity. 
To achieve this objective, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H1: Social vulnerability factors decrease the representational capacity of social 
media more during a crisis period than during a normal period.  
This hypothesis is tested in the specific context of Houston, Texas during and after 
Hurricane Harvey. It is tested through the comparison of principal component regression 
 86 
models constructed using social vulnerability factors and Twitter posts per person (referred 
to as Twitter activity) in discrete geographic areas in crisis and non-crisis states. This work 
helps to identify which kinds of people crisis informatics analyses tend to exclude, and 
whether that exclusion is predictable prior to a crisis. In describing the effect of a crisis on 
the ability or proclivity of vulnerable populations to Tweet, this research will inform how 
a crisis influences the severity, reach, and magnitude of any pre-existing digital divide.  
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Social Media Data Acquisition 
To address H1, the influence of social vulnerability factors on both the Twitter 
activity during a “normal period” and the activity during a “crisis period” needed to be 
compared. To achieve this, the researchers streamed and filtered Tweets produced from 
five weeks prior to the recognition of Hurricane Harvey in the Atlantic (July 9th-August 
17th, 2017) and the two-week period following Hurricane Harvey’s first landfall in 
Houston, Texas (August 25th to September 8th, 2017). The first series of dates comprises 
the “steady state”: a normal period during which Twitter users in Houston were not 
influenced by the oncoming hurricane. The second series comprises the “perturbed state”: 
a period during which Twitter users were influenced by the hurricane. The week-long gap 
between the two (August 18th – August 24th, 2017) accounts for a “transitionary state” 
during which Twitter users were aware of an incoming crisis and likely modulated their 
interactions with Twitter despite not being presently affected by physical threats. The use 
of a five-week steady state was predicated on the recommendation of a four- to six-week 
steady state by Toepke (Toepke 2018a). 
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The geolocated Twitter data for the greater metropolitan area of Houston for six 
weeks prior to and two weeks following Hurricane Harvey's landfall were streamed 
through the Twitter API (Wang and Taylor, 2015). The raw Tweet count total in the greater 
Houston metropolitan area for the six weeks prior to the hurricane’s landfall was 
approximately 436,000 Tweets; the raw Tweet count total for the two weeks following 
landfall was 154,000. Out of concern for the presence of Twitter bots, which are accounts 
that automatically post Tweets when specific conditions are met, these Tweets were filtered 
using a mix of keyword analysis and the OSoMe tool Botometer (Indiana University 2018; 
Toepke 2018b; Yang et al. 2019). Although the comparison of steady and perturbed state 
precludes the incorporation of textual analysis comparisons, the percentage of Tweets 
containing one of a series of Hurricane Harvey-related words (such as ‘Harvey’, 
‘hurricane’, ‘flood’, ‘PrayForHouston’, etc.) was analyzed. The percentage of Harvey-
related Tweets prior to Hurricane Harvey’s first landfall was 6%. This percentage rose to 
a peak of 62% on August 27th, the date of Hurricane Harvey’s second landfall. 
Tweets for each day of both the steady and perturbed state were aggregated by day 
and then plotted in ArcGIS. Heatmaps depicting the geographic distribution of filtered 
Tweets for one day of the steady state, transitionary state, and perturbed state are presented 
as Figure 16a, b, and c respectively. 
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Figure 16a-c. A comparison of the geographical distribution of processed Twitter posts 
across the city of Houston for different days. Darker green hexagons indicate low Twitter 
activity, whereas brighter yellow hexagons indicate higher Twitter activity. (Left) is a 
heatmap for a day of the steady state (August 7th, 2017); (middle) is a heatmap for a day of 
the transitionary state (August 20th, 2017); and (right) is a heatmap for a day of the 
perturbed state (August 27th, 2017). 
4.3.2 Distributing Demographic Data 
Vulnerability indices are based on foundational social research addressing the 
socioeconomic, mobility, disability, and resource-availability factors that cause 
discrepancies in the abilities of people to rebuild after disaster.  Most of these vulnerability 
indices are defined at the census tract level and use census data and other social indicator 
data, such as school performance and community connectedness, to quantify vulnerability. 
Unfortunately, there are two problems inherent in using census tracts to analyze 
vulnerability data: the bounds of census tracts are socially biased, and census tracts have 
such large variations in size that the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) can have a 
significant impact on the results’ reliability (Cromley and McLafferty 2002; Nelson and 
Brewer 2017; Saib et al. 2014). In terms of size, the census tracts within Houston range in 
size from 0.16 km2 to 677.20 km2. This wide range in size can also contribute to data bias 
in aggregate (Grubesic and Matisziw 2006). Aggregating data in equal-area, uniform 
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shapes can reduce the MAUP’s impact on the vulnerability analysis (Nelson and Brewer 
2017); however, this required redistributing the census data to a more granular scale. 
The geographic information science (GIS) field has historically utilized National 
Land Cover Database (NLCD) data to increase the granularity of census data with 
substantial accuracy (Reibel and Agrawal 2007).  The NLCD contains a raster file with 30 
meters (m) by 30 m cells that have been classified, through satellite imagery, as one of 16 
classes.  The classification includes four classes of developed land: open space, low 
intensity, medium intensity, and high intensity. These classifications are determined using 
the amount of water-permeable and water-impermeable land; thus, the “open space” 
designation does not necessarily describe areas with no people, but rather areas with a 
relatively smaller (<20%) amount of concrete-covered land, like suburbs. The raster cells 
from the 2011 dataset that were classified as “developed” were extracted and clipped to the 
greater metropolitan Houston Area.  Using ArcGIS' Raster to Point function, each of the 
raster cells were transformed into points located at the center of each cell and spatially 
joined by count into the census tracts for Houston.  Using the counts of each type of NLCD 
class and the population record for each census tract, a multiple linear regression analysis 
was performed to determine the expected contribution of each type of land type to the 
tract’s population. The model is presented as Eq. 2.  
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡




In Eq. 2, Popt is the population for a given census tract t; OpenAreat is the number 
of NLCD cells described as “Open Space (Developed)” within the census tract; LowIntt is 
the number of cells described as “Low Intensity (Developed)” within the tract; MedIntt is 
the number of cells described as “Medium Intensity (Developed)”; and HighIntt is the 
number described as “High Intensity (Developed)”. The results of the regression analysis 
are presented in Table 6. The model has an adjusted R-squared of 0.8317 and a model p-
value of <0.001.  
Table 6. Multiple linear regression results for the NLCD land class types and the census 
data. 





Open area 0.30 0.03 <0.001*** 0.23 
Low intensity 0.11 0.07 0.123 0.19 
Medium intensity 4.50 0.10 <0.001*** 0.58 
High intensity -2.34 0.12 <0.001*** 0.01 
 
The model coefficients were used to determine the weighted averages of each land 
type within each census tract.  As shown, the areas of very intense development have a 
substantial and significant negative contribution to the residential population of the 
Houston census tracts.  Bian and Wilmot encountered similar results in New Orleans, 
Louisiana in a study using the same technique to study disadvantaged populations impacted 
by Hurricane Katrina (Bian and Wilmot 2017). Following ground proofing techniques, they 
assigned a positive but very small assigned coefficient to the highly developed areas of the 
city.  Following their example for the purposes of the population disaggregation, we 
determined the ratio of each model coefficient to the coefficient range (-2.34 to 4.50) and 
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used this scaled ratio as the re-scaled coefficient. This process ensured a match between 
the census data population and the population assigned within each tract such that the 
disaggregation would be at least as accurate. It also preserved the ratio of the magnitude of 
impact between categories.  
The assigned coefficients were employed as weighted averages in Eq. 3 to 







  (5) 
In Eq. 3, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  is the population represented by a single 30mx30m NLCD raster 
cell point of NLCD type i within a specific census tract; the NLCD types of “Open area”, 
“Low intensity”, “Medium intensity”, and “High intensity” are represented as i→l; WAi is 
the weighted average for the specific land type; WAi→l is the sum of the weighted averages 
for each land type; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is the total population within the census tract in which the 
point is located; and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the total number of points of type i within the specific 
census tract.  The resulting dataset was a grid of point files spaced 30 meters apart that 
could be aggregated into equal-area, uniform areas with less structural bias than census 
tracts. Although the accuracy of this method cannot be accounted for at a 30mx30m scale, 
the regression results and the rescaling of the coefficients lend the assurance of reasonable 
accuracy for larger-scale aggregation. 
For the vulnerable population assignment, the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) 
developed at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) was used (Flanagan et al. 2011).  This 
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data is available at the census tract level and the margin of error is included within each 
estimate, allowing for the removal of factors with an error greater than 90% (the Census 
Bureau standard). These factors made the CDC’s SVI ideal for this analysis.  To distribute 
the vulnerability factors, a simple weighted average was used. The percentages of the 
population ascribing to the SVI factors were multiplied by the identified population of the 
points produced prior. For example, if a single point had been assigned a population of 
0.96 people through Eqs. 1 and 2 and is located in a census tract with a population that is 
12% unemployed, that 30mx30m point is noted to represent the equivalent of 0.11 
unemployed peoples. Although there are no fractions of people living in Houston, this work 
is based on the evidence that vulnerable groups are spatially clustered in cities (Cutter and 
Finch 2008) and, at aggregated scales, is accurate within reasonable error (Bian and Wilmot 
2017). 
This method was used to develop an estimate for the number of people ascribing to 
the following 13 vulnerability categories within each area: people without vehicle access; 
people with limited English skills; minorities; people living in single parent-households; 
disabled people; people over 65; people under 17; uninsured people; people without a high 
school diploma; unemployed people; people below the poverty line; people living in 
crowded homes (defined as those homes with more than 1.5 people in residence per room); 
and people living in homes within multi-unit complexes.  
It should be noted here that the CDC’s SVI includes additional factors; however, 
“persons living within mobile homes” and the “income” factor were not included within 
this analysis. This decision was made because each of these violated one or more of the 
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assumptions of the analytical techniques used and is discussed further in the Limitations 
section.  
4.3.3 Scalar Aggregation Nets 
The Twitter and demographic data were aggregated into a spatial net composed of 
uniform hexagons approximately 5 square kilometers (km2) in area. Using equal-area, 
uniform polygons can mitigate some of the bias introduced by ZCTAs through the 
modifiable areal unit problem (Jelinski and Wu 1996).  Hexagons are better suited for tiling 
large geospatial areas because of their scalability and the reduction in sampling bias from 
edge effects (Carr et al. 1992). There is a constant tradeoff between analytical reliability 
and data usability when utilizing different scales for social research. For this study, the size 
of 5 km2 was chosen based on (1) the area at which the population data was collected 
(census tracts in Houston have a median size of 4.9 km2), and (2) prior research identifying 
minimal tradeoffs in social media analytical reliability at the 5-15 km2 (Samuels and Taylor 
2019b).  
Maps of the redistributed census data and a uniform, equal-area hexagonal net are 
presented as Figure 17a-b. One of the critical factors for choosing this size was that, at 5 
km2 the data meets the regression assumption that the variables are normally distributed; 
the distributions of both the averaged steady state data and the averaged perturbed state 
data are presented as Figure 18.  
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Figure 17a-b. A comparison of the redistributed census data and a uniform, equal-area 
hexagonal net. (Left) the green areas indicate areas with lower population density, and 
those in red indicate areas with high population density. (Right) Each hexagon contains 80 
km2; larger hexagons were used in place of those used in the analysis (5 km2) for improve 
readability. 
 
Figure 18. A density graph depicting the distribution of the log of the average Twitter 
activity across the steady state (pink) and the average Twitter activity across the perturbed 
state (blue). 
The daily Tweets and the redistributed population data were spatially joined (via 
count and sum respectively) to the 5 km2 hexagonal net.  The Twitter activity for each day 
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was generated by dividing the number of filtered Twitter posts on each day by the estimated 
number of people residing in each area. The Twitter activity on a “normal” day was 
generated by averaging the observed Twitter activity values across the defined steady state. 
To focus on people in potential danger from the hurricane, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Building Level damage assessments were used to identify 
areas experiencing infrastructural damage.  This dataset contains a list of building locations 
(latitudes and longitudes) and an integer damage rating from 1 to 4 (affected, minor 
damage, major damage, and destroyed). Other studies have chosen to utilize data from 
insurance claims to verify or validate relative quantities of hurricane damage or physical 
storm threat (Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016; Rufat et al. 2019). However, as discussed by Cutter 
and Finch, “this approach assumes that the most socially vulnerable populations have the 
most to lose (economically), which is not the case. In correlating property losses with social 
vulnerability, we would expect an inverse relationship (high social vulnerability; low dollar 
losses)…” (Cutter and Finch 2008). To mitigate the potential impact of this inverse 
relationship on the regression model, areas experiencing more or less hurricane damage 
were identified through the number of FEMA Building Level damage assessments 
performed in each 5-km2 area and not insurance data. 
Finally, from the three datasets amassed through the methods above (Twitter posts 
per person, estimated percentages of people described by social vulnerability factors, and 
the number of FEMA Building Level damage assessments that identified infrastructure 
damage), areas of interest were extracted from the original 4,849 hexagons. Of those, 1,113 
had residential populations as recorded by the census and the disaggregation method. 
Second, crisis informatics and the relevance of the analysis is dependent on populations 
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that contribute to social media before a storm. Therefore, polygons with zero Twitter 
activity during the steady state period was removed from the analysis, leaving 452 
hexagons. As emergency managers are specifically interested in people in areas strongly 
impacted by crises, only areas that had an instance of a FEMA Building Level damage 
assessment of at least “minor damage” were used. The remaining 213 areas are depicted in 
Figure 19a-b. Figure 19a depicts the short-listed hexagons color-coded according to the 
distribution of disabled peoples and overlaid by the FEMA Building Level damage 
assessments, and Figure 19b depicts the distribution of unemployed peoples in the short-
listed hexagons. 
 
Figure 19a-b. Maps depicting the short-listed hexagons used in the PCR analysis. The 
hexagons are colored to indicate the relative number of persons within those areas that are 
described by a vulnerability factor, with a lighter blue indicating fewer vulnerable people 
and a darker blue indicating more vulnerable people. (Left) shows the distribution of 
disabled peoples, and (Right) shows the distribution of unemployed peoples. Overlaid 
across the hexagons is the distribution of FEMA Building Level damage assessments, 
which are colored on a gradient from dark green to red, with green indicating less damage 
and red indicating more damage. 
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4.3.4 Principal Component Regression Analysis 
With the population data and Twitter data reaggregated into equal area, uniform 
polygons, the impact of social vulnerability of Twitter data needed to be assessed. 
Regression is often utilized to determine the relationship between variables; however, 
social vulnerability factors tend to be highly collinear. The Pearson correlations of the 
percentages of people described by the social vulnerability factors of interest are depicted 
in Figure 20. One common method for removing the complication of multicollinearity in 
vulnerability factors is principal component analysis (PCA).  
PCA has been used consistently in vulnerability science to determine the 
relationships between vulnerability factors and disaster impacts (Cutter and Finch 2008; 
Khajehei et al. 2020; Lou et al. 2012; de Loyola Hummell et al. 2016; Mavhura et al. 2017). 
It has also been used in the context of social influences on critical infrastructure issues in 
identifying the most salient and relevant impactors (Yap et al. 2019). The process 
transforms a collection of input variables into a series of statistically independent 
components. Each component is composed of “loadings” that are essentially the 
contribution of each variable to that component. The loadings are determined through 
covariance analyses between the variables. The first component that is produced is a vector 
that describes the most variance possible across the variables; the second component is a 
vector that is orthogonal to the first and describes the most variance possible of the 
remaining variability, and so on (Glen et al. 1989). PCA is preferred because it reduces the 
data’s dimensionality (number of considered variables) while preserving the underlying 




Figure 20. A Pearson correlation matrix displaying the covariance of the 
sociodemographic factors selected for the vulnerability analysis. The factors included were 
the percentage of: crowded homes, people in poverty, people with limited English-speaking 
abilities, no high school diploma, the uninsured, unemployed people, people with physical 
disabilities, single-parent households, people under 17, people in minority groups, people 
living in apartments, people over the age of 65, and people without a vehicle. 
Following the acquisition of independent principal components that contain the 
vulnerable populations data, the components most suitable for regression needed to be 
determined. The number of components that should be used in the regression analysis was 
determined by the “one-sigma method”, which involves calculating the validation plots 
with the root mean square error of prediction (RMSEP) and identifying the model with the 
fewest components that is less than one standard error away from the best model (Bro et 
al. 2008). Per standard principal component regression (PCR) practice (Wehrens et al. 
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2019), the chosen principal components and the dependent variable (Twitter data) were 
standardized and scaled. These components were then utilized in a regression analysis 
described by Eq. 4.  
 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐   (4) 
In Eq. 4, TwActstate is the Twitter activity (daily Tweets per person) in the temporal 
state being analyzed. PC1 is the first principal component, and n is the number of 
components determined through the one-sigma method described above. The amount of 
variability in TwActstate for both the steady state average daily Twitter activity and the daily 
Twitter activity observed in the perturbed state were compared using k-fold cross-
validation (CV) with ten segments. This was one of the benefits of using PCR: the 
regressors were the same in both models. Otherwise, results generated using different 
response variables would not be explicitly comparable (Glen et al. 1989; Mevik and 
Wehrens 2015). 
Finally, as one of the research objectives for this work was to identify which 
vulnerability factors contribute more or less to variation in Twitter activity, jackknife 
validation (similar to bootstrapping) was performed to compare the strength and 
significance of the input vulnerability variables for each model. Jackknife validation 
through the R package ‘pls’ (2.7-2) was chosen to predict the variance of the estimators 





The number of components n for each model were analyzed first. As this aspect of 
the PCR process can be quite subjective, graphs depicting the RMSEP of PCR models 
produced with different quantities of incorporated principal components are depicted in 
Figure 21a-c.  Smaller RMSEPs indicate models with less error. Figure 21a depicts the 
RMSEP validation plot for the steady state model; Figure 21b depicts the RMSEP 
validation plot for the date of Hurricane Harvey’s first landfall in Houston (August 25th, 
2017), and Figure 21c shows the plot for Harvey’s second, more damaging landfall 
(August 27th, 2017). These two perturbed state days were chosen as examples due to their 
heightened impact and thus their greater relevance to emergency management. Based on 
the number of components that minimized the RMSEP for these models, three components 
(n=3) were used in the PCR model described in Eq. 4 for the model for the first landfall; 
one component (n=1) was used for the PCR model for the second landfall, and three 
components (n=3) were used for the steady state.  
Because two of the three depicted models utilized three principal components, the 
contribution of each of the vulnerability factors to the first three components of the model 
for August 25th, 2017, for August 27th, 2017, and for the average steady state day are 
depicted in Figure 22a-c respectively. The first principal component (PC1), which 
describes the greatest amount of variance (80%) and has the greatest influence on the 
model, is of primary interest in this analysis. Each of the first components for the models 
are impacted by each vulnerability factor in roughly the same proportion, as would be 
expected considering their high degree of multicollinearity depicted in Figure 20.  
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Figure 21a-c. Graphs depicting the relationship between the RMSEP and the number of 
components included in the PCR model for (top) Twitter activity prediction in the steady 
state period, (middle) on Hurricane Harvey’s first landfall (August 25th, 2017), and 
(bottom) on the second landfall (August 27th, 2017). The dashed blue vertical lines indicate 
the number of components selected to be incorporated into the final models through the 
one-sigma method. The blue circles indicate the one-sigma bands around the RMSEP 




Figure 22a-c. Graphs depicting the contribution of individual vulnerability factors to the 
first three principal components developed through PCA for (top) Twitter activity 
prediction in the steady state period, (middle) on Hurricane Harvey’s first landfall (August 
25th, 2017), and (bottom) on the second landfall (August 27th, 2017). The black lines 
indicate the weights associated with the separate PC1s; the red dashed lines indicate those 
for the separate PC2s; and the green dotted lines indicate those for the separate PC3s. 
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The percentage of variation in the Twitter activity described by the PCR model and 
the jackknife validation results for the input coefficients for the steady state and both 
landfall dates are shown in Table 7. The amount of variance in Twitter activity described 
by PC1 is drastically different between steady and perturbed states. Vulnerability factors 
appear to predict approximately 9% of the variation in Twitter activity during a “typical 
day”; however, they predict 41% of the variation in Twitter activity when Houston was 
suffering the worst of Hurricane Harvey’s wrath. Additionally, the variables that 
significantly predict the 9% of Twitter activity during the steady state are limited to the 
unemployed, the disabled, minorities, and people living in apartments (which contributes 
positively). This is in direct opposition to the variable coefficients observed in a crisis 
period, which are almost all extremely significant (p<0.001) and negative. This trend is 
observed more strongly on Hurricane Harvey’s second, more destructive landfall (August 
27th) than its first (August 25th). The coefficients for each of the vulnerable populations 
except for minorities and disabled populations observed for the Twitter data on the 27th are 
stronger and more significantly correlated with a decrease in Twitter activity. 
The amount of variance in Twitter activity peaks on the 27th and generally declines 
afterwards. This trend matches that of the rainfall data for the week following Hurricane 
Harvey and is shown in Figure 21. 
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Table 7. Variable coefficients derived from the PCR model for the steady state Twitter 















% In Poverty 0.06 -0.08*** -0.09*** 
% Unemployed -0.10** -0.08*** -0.12*** 
% No High School -0.09 -0.08*** -0.07** 
% Uninsured -0.05 -0.08*** -0.10*** 
% Over 65 -0.16 -0.07*** -0.14*** 
% Under 17 -0.23 -0.08*** -0.13*** 
% Disabled -0.17* -0.08*** -0.13*** 
% Single Parent 
Household 
-0.13 -0.08*** -0.11*** 
% Minority -0.12* -0.08*** -0.11*** 
% Limited English -0.03 -0.06** 0.01 
% Apartment 0.44*** -0.03* -0.11* 
% Crowded Homes 0.05 -0.04* 0.13* 
% No Vehicle 0.19 -0.05 0.06 
% Twitter Activity 
Variance Explained 9.7% 33% 41% 
Note: p-value <0.0001***, < 0.001**, <0.01*, <0.05’ 
aThe social vulnerability factors shown above correspond, in order, with the following: 
people below the poverty line; unemployed people; people without a high school 
diploma; uninsured people; people over 65; people under 17; disabled people; people 
living in single parent-households; racial minorities; people with limited English 
skills; people living in crowded homes; people without vehicle access; and people 






Figure 23. A barplot depicting, in pink, the percentage of variance in Twitter activity 
explained by the percentage of vulnerable populations within each area, and in blue, the 
amount of rainfall recorded at the Houston International Airport (NOAA). 
4.5 Discussion 
These results confirm a distinction in the covariance of populations described by 
social vulnerability factors and Twitter activity between steady states and perturbed states. 
They confirm H1 by showing that the covariance of social vulnerability and per capita 
Twitter activity is near-negligible during non-crisis periods yet are profound during a crisis. 
That vulnerable populations tend to contribute less to the social media stream during a 
hurricane had been identified previously (Wang et al. 2019; Xiao et al. 2015; Zou et al. 
2019); however, the influence of the crisis itself on this disparity had not been confirmed 
with respect to a time period completely external to the crisis (outside of preparation, 
response, and recovery periods), nor had the severity of that influence been quantified. 
Without this comparison, the link between a crisis and a worsening digital divide could not 
be uncovered. The major contribution of this paper is the determination that vulnerable 
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populations decrease their Twitter activity during a major crisis due to factors separate 
from those present during the steady state, such as lack of connectivity.   
Thus, although prior research had suggested that crisis informatics can rely less on 
the representation of vulnerable groups (Zou et al. 2019), this disparity had been attributed 
to factors quantified by omnipresent, universal metrics like lack of access to phones, 
computers, or the internet caused by lack of money or stable housing—as opposed to 
potential infrastructure service failures caused by a hurricane in vulnerable areas. Were this 
true, crisis informatics could avoid inequity by identifying areas with consistent social 
media use during a steady state then weighting the influence of social media crisis 
information higher in those areas. Unfortunately, hurricanes function as a large 
confounding factor on how vulnerable attributes affect Twitter activity. The predictors of 
Twitter activity are shown to not be the same between states, and the influence of 
vulnerability factors on crisis Twitter activity cannot be predicted using steady state Twitter 
activity. The digital divide likely exists in some form prior to a hurricane; however, the 
hurricane appears to severely worsen that divide. Accounting for the exact influence of a 
crisis on access to technology will be more difficult than contextualizing in-crisis Twitter 
activity by historical Tweeting (as argued for by Chen et al. 2013) or weighting information 
importance by considering both population and the Odds Ratio (de Albuquerque et al. 
2015; Takahashi et al. 2015).  
These points are especially poignant when considering how much greater of an 
impact sociodemographic factors have on Twitter activity when compared to the 
experience of hurricane damage. Similar to Xiao et al., this research finds that demographic 
factors are better predictors of Twitter activity in a hurricane than the quantity of hurricane-
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induced damage (Xiao et al. 2015). What is shown in contradiction to their conclusions, 
however, is that this disparity is not necessarily a direct result of the digital divide (i.e., 
pre-crisis lack of access to technology for vulnerable populations). Pre-crisis, variability in 
the percentage of vulnerable populations can explain less than 10% of the variance in 
Twitter activity. This indicates that crisis informatics should not assign the blame for the 
disparity in activity to omnipresent social factors, which might be identifiable, measurable, 
and thus predictable before a crisis hits. To ascertain what populations are equitably 
represented by social media produced during a crisis, further research will clearly need to 
identify and quantify what aspects of a crisis are, in fact, the ones deepening the digital 
divide. 
The noted strong covariance between social vulnerability factors and Twitter 
activity is also very persistent across time. Research has repeatedly shown that vulnerable 
populations find it more difficult to recover from disasters, and their recovery takes longer 
(Comfort et al. 1999; Flanagan et al. 2011; Villegas et al. 2018). This longer recovery time 
can be attributed to lack of savings, lack of other intangible assets such as community 
connectivity, weaker building infrastructure, and lack of knowledge or access to post-
emergency aid (Fothergill and Peek 2004). Models describing strategies to improve post-
disaster insurance strategies emphasize the influence of income level on the tendency of 
families to insure themselves; the ability of vulnerable families to restore their 
communication infrastructure could lag far behind others (Eid et al. 2015). 
The presented results show a significant but slow decrease in the negative 
covariance between vulnerability factors and Twitter activity post-landfall and across the 
recovery period. This shallow slope could indicate that the lack of access to resources noted 
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in vulnerability studies includes hurricane-induced lack of access to internet or other 
communication technology. Further necessary work includes the comparison of social 
media access and use recovery rates between vulnerable and less vulnerable populations. 
This is particularly necessary in the context of online crisis communication. If the 
hurricane-induced disparity between populations is due to lack of access to technologies, 
crisis manager communications regarding access to federal aid, shelters, or resource 
availability could be missed for a substantial period following landfall. 
The exact impact of hurricane severity on the divide is also called into question. 
The presented models show slightly stronger, more significant coefficients for the Twitter 
activity observed on Harvey’s second landfall as compared to its first. Harvey’s second 
landfall generated a profound amount of flooding across the city, and is largely considered 
to be the period during which the most infrastructural damage and life-threatening 
situations were caused (Amadeo 2017; Zurich and Global Disaster Preparedness Center 
2018). Other crisis informatics studies that have identified geographic data shadows—
areas in which social media data was severely diminished or missing during a storm—were 
performed on Hurricane Sandy (Shelton et al. 2014; Xiao et al. 2015), another 
exceptionally damaging hurricane even in the recent history of increasingly damaging 
hurricanes (Gall et al. 2011; Hauer et al. 2016). Stronger hurricanes also have a stronger 
impact on energy infrastructures, potentially leading to decreased communications access 
(Ilbeigi and Dilkina 2018; Reed et al. 2010). If the negative influence of vulnerability 
factors is more prevalent during episodes of increased hurricane damage, it is even more 
important for the crisis informatics community to determine how to balance the use of 
social media crisis information against the communities it best represents. Otherwise, 
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social media crisis informatics run the risk of failing vulnerable communities when they 
might need help and resources the most. 
To mitigate that risk, more research is necessary to investigate the relationship 
between vulnerability and crisis-specific drop-offs in social media usage. Future work 
should concern itself with further delimiting the effects of specific vulnerability indicators 
on the relative decrease in available information from specific populations. Although the 
components generated through PCR contain aspects of distinct factors, the geographic 
clustering of vulnerable populations (Cutter and Finch 2008; Shelton et al. 2015) and thus 
their spatial collinearity can make differentiating demographic-specific correlations 
difficult, particularly at spatial scales smaller than those of data collection. Previous work 
has shown a slightly larger decrease in crisis data available from populations without access 
to vehicles, the disabled, and the elderly (Samuels and Taylor 2019a; Zou et al. 2019); 
however, the interactions between human social media behavior, resource availability, and 
infrastructural resilience still need to be accounted for. 
Previous research into the distribution of vulnerability as it relates to infrastructure, 
hazard threat, and demographic factors notes that the vulnerability of U.S. cities to hazards, 
and the resulting variation in recovery time, is highly city-dependent (Borden et al. 2007). 
The presence or absence of this phenomenon, in more and less vulnerable cities, should be 
explored. The city-specific context of crisis information and vulnerable populations also 
informs the potential for a wide variety of influences on the quantity of available 
information. One of the reasons why Houston was ideal for this analysis is because there 
were no evacuation orders given to the city itself prior to August 25th, 2017. Officials told 
citizens to stay home instead of evacuating, thus evacuation had a lesser effect in Houston 
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than it might have in, for instance, Miami as it was hit by Hurricane Irma. In another city, 
areas with less vulnerable populations may exhibit a sharper decrease in Twitter activity 
because those populations are more easily able to evacuate (Bian and Wilmot 2017). The 
city context additionally matters in the context of the previously highlighted data bias 
against rural populations. The density of people and, separately, the density of Twitter 
users, need to be incorporated into how, when, and where social media is used for crisis 
response (Hecht and Stephens 2014) 
From a civil engineering perspective, this research isolated areas impacted by 
infrastructural damage; understanding the influence of the influence of city-wide 
infrastructure damage and service disruption, especially as related to power and 
telecommunication coverage, should be explored. A stronger link to the distinct between 
the influences of infrastructure and human social media behavior should be established in 
order to help understand how to measure and thus ameliorate disasters’ impact. Especially 
as this research utilized original Twitter postings as its metric for social media involvement, 
the results cannot specifically inform decisions about the potential gaps in emergency 
information distribution or risk assessment. Understanding what factors are lessening 
vulnerable populations’ social media involvement will be integral for crisis communication 
through social media as well (Fan et al. 2019; Lachlan et al. 2016; Olteanu et al. 2015). 
4.5.1 Limitations and Future Work 
First, although this research intended to highlight an aspect of bias within the use 
of Twitter data in crisis response, this research is not immune to bias itself. The data is 
limited to Tweets that are geotagged, which introduces a secondary factor of population 
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bias (Malik et al. 2015). Existing methods for verifying a geotag location (through, for 
example, the location given in a user’s profile) have made only modest changes in location 
and temporal confidence, and there are substantial demographic biases that are difficult to 
account for (Jiang et al. 2019). Future work on this subject should consider the combination 
of multiple location-validation metrics (Grace et al. 2017). 
One major limitation of this study is the population distribution technique. First, it 
was not possible to assess the accuracy of the technique at the 5 km2 aggregation except 
through ground-truthing methods. Second, while re-scaling the coefficients ensured that 
the disaggregated data (if re-aggregated into census tracts) would exactly match the census 
tract data and that no areas would have a “negative” population, it diminished the 
geographical variance in population data. These two concerns, while mitigated by the 
choice of 5 km2 aggregation areas and the good fit of the regression model, should be 
explored further. Additionally, in terms of the distribution of the vulnerable populations, a 
more fine-tuned and nuanced distribution would be necessary for more localized analyses. 
A more accurate model would redistribute the SVI factors based on additional known 
vulnerability factors, such as historic redlining, areas of historic segregation, and areas of 
previous hazard damages. However, that data is not widely or consistently accessible to the 
authors across the city of Houston and, at the 5 km2 scale, in unlikely to strongly affect the 
conclusions presented here. Finally, the NLCD distribution is limited to nighttime and not 
daytime accuracy. That said, based on the Twitter data text content, many businesses were 
closed and many people stayed in their homes regardless.  
Ultimately, based on the above, research on population disaggregation for crisis 
research is necessary. Particularly because some localized crises can happen at very small 
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scales (Wurman and Kosiba 2018). In their paper, Wurman and Kosiba theorized that the 
existence of small-scale vortices could cause some major discrepancies between 
infrastructural damages would occur at the sub-county level. It is possible that major 
discrepancies in social media responses reacting to storm damage could vary at small 
scales, which could not be captured in this paper. 
An additional vulnerability factor limitation is the absence of mobile home 
occupants and income data. Unfortunately, although mobile homes are severely impacted 
by hurricanes, the data violated two assumptions of the chosen data analysis: lack of 
outliers and sampling adequacy. The mobile home data for the whole dataset is bimodally 
distributed, with local maximums at both zero and in the 90th percentile. The number of 
areas with sufficient mobile home data in our study area did not meet the method’s 
requirements for sampling adequacy. This is likely due to the geographic clustering of 
mobile homes and trailer parks. Finally, the “income” factor provided by the CDC is the 
average income for the census tract, and not the “percent of people” utilized for each of the 
other factors. Although this could theoretically be quantified in the same way by using 
income intervals, income data is only available as an average and not as a distribution, so 
the numbers of people at or below a certain income threshold cannot be determined. 
Fortunately, both of these factors are moderately or strongly correlated with other SVI 
factors, and their exclusion likely does not significantly impact the results. 
In terms of spatial filtration, this research was isolated to areas that sustained 
infrastructural damage during Hurricane Harvey. This was performed to avoid the false 
equivalence of increased insurance claims with increased personal threat from the 
hurricane, but it fails to account for the potential confounding factor of vulnerable 
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populations being more likely to reside within vulnerable infrastructure. The incorporation 
of the presence of hurricane damage as a presence/absence factor instead of an ordinal one 
was to mitigate this potential influence. 
Another limitation of this work is the temporal granularity of a single day. Recent 
research has identified the ability of Twitter to detect sub-events (events on more localized 
space and time scales) through burst and topic analysis (Arachie et al. 2019). Reactions to 
and complications with sub-events, such as the release of the dams on the Addicks and 
Barker reservoirs on Buffalo Bayou and the evacuation of the Ben Taub hospital during 
Hurricane Harvey, can be critical pieces of information for emergency managers. Future 
research should investigate how the bias against vulnerable populations highlighted here 
also affect their ability to help identify sub-events, or the topic distribution of those 
populations’ Tweets. Topic modeling of Tweets from vulnerable and non-vulnerable areas 
across the four stages of a disaster could inform how to better incorporate those areas into 
social media analyses for emergency management. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that this research is unable 
to isolate the causes, social or technical, of the differences in social media interaction 
within vulnerable populations. Future work should be focused on distinctions between 
scalar aggregations and the root causes of the Twitter activity disparity. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In the midst of increasingly dangerous hurricanes and populous coastal cities, 
addressing the deficit of reliable, accurate crisis information is a necessity. Social media 
and volunteered geographic information offer one potential source of information mid-
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crisis; however, equitable stewardship of this data requires understanding who this data 
best represents. Previous research has shown that this data is not equally representative of 
all populations in the middle of a crisis, motivating work to delineate how this data can 
best be used. The research presented in this paper shows that blind usage of social media 
data will prioritize resource distribution to the least vulnerable in a way that is antithetical 
to urban resilience. Furthermore, this research establishes that the presence or absence of 
social media during a steady state cannot quantify the impact a crisis will have on social 
media usage during a crisis. The major contribution of this paper is evidence that there is 
something fundamentally different in how vulnerable populations are able to—or want 
to—use social media during a crisis as opposed to a steady state period.  
This drastically complicates how crisis informatics should prioritize social media 
information. Balancing the usage of new and important forms of information with which 
populations are most aided by that information is going to be one of the principal ethical 
questions concerning the pursuit of the smarter, more resilient city. As urban analytics and 
decision-making begin to utilize more big data produced by the interactions between 
people and technology, delineating why a crisis-specific discrepancy in social media data 
exists will be critical for equitable data stewardship. Ultimately, emergency responders 
seeking to use social media data (and any form of humans-as-sensors data) need to 
incorporate the in-crisis discrepancies between data produced by general and vulnerable 
populations. In so doing, we can begin the process of bridging these crisis-centric gaps in 
technological infrastructure instead of deepening the divide.   
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4.7 Data Availability Statement 
Some data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available 
from the corresponding author upon reasonable request: 
1. The aggregated Twitter count data for any of the days or areas included in the 
analysis 
2. The FEMA Building Level damage assessment data for Houston, TX  
3. The code utilized to aggregate the data  
4. The code utilized to perform the PCR analysis 
Some data, models, or code generated or used during the study are proprietary or 
confidential in nature and may only be provided with restrictions (e.g. anonymized data): 
1. The Twitter data utilized herein has personally identifiable information and cannot 
be provided as it was streamed from the Twitter API. Twitter, Inc. has additionally 
restricted the amount and kind of data that can be shared between end users. 
Therefore, individual Tweets cannot be provided; only aggregated (and thus 
anonymized) data can be provided. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Within the body of work presented herein, I have tested the boundaries of social 
media data for usage in crisis response. I have sought to understand what can be learned 
through an absence of data; what influence scale has on analytical conclusions; and how 
disadvantaged populations are underserved in social media analyses. As the potential utility 
of social media continues to be explored by researchers and emergency managers, it is 
imperative that the equity and limitations of that data are not only acknowledged but 
incorporated. 
To assist with taking the first steps down that path, I began my doctoral research 
by examining how sudden social media silence could be an indication of severe instead of 
minimal harm. Using steady state and perturbed state analyses, I showed that incorporating 
social media activity deviation instead of only social media bursts could better identify 
areas of infrastructural damage. In my second study, I showed how changes in the scale at 
which social media data is analyzed strongly affects how many areas show statistically 
reliable quantities of data, the level of correlation between Twitter activity and 
infrastructural damage, and whether bursts of activity or a sudden absence of it is more 
common during a crisis. In my last study, I showed that social vulnerability factors strongly 
negatively influence the amount of data produced in areas with a high degree of socially 
vulnerable populations, and that this influence is much stronger in a crisis state than in a 
normal state. The results of these studies were intended to be applied towards both social 
media crisis applications developers and emergency managers seeking to make sense and 
correctly interpret the social media data generated during crises. In the following sections, 
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I describe the contributions of each study and opportunities for future research based on 
those contributions. 
5.1 Silence of the Tweets 
I began my research just as Hurricane Harvey was wreaking havoc on Houston. As 
I started to explore the innovative research being performed using social media data, I first 
encountered the research that Shelton et al. had performed on Twitter data from Hurricane 
Sandy (Shelton et al. 2014). Although Shelton and his team had focused on the geography 
of Twitter and the spatial relationships in the data, they noted in a supplemental analysis 
that Staten Island—which contained 50% of the deaths incurred by Hurricane Sandy—had 
almost a complete lack of Twitter posts. Shelton referred to blank spots such as this as 
“data shadows” and commented on the lack of ubiquity of social media data. Due to the 
disparity between this observation and the often-touted positive correlation between 
Twitter activity and infrastructure damage (Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016), I initially sought to 
confirm the theory that sudden social media silence like that on Staten Island was not an 
outlier but rather a reliable indicator of hurricane damage. Within Silence of the Tweets, I 
show that the absolute deviation in Twitter activity from a steady state has a stronger, more 
positive, statistically significant correlation with damage as compared to the raw deviation. 
This confirms the theory that absence of evidence of hazardous events on social media is 
not evidence of absence; indeed, that the opposite is more likely. 
Although I cannot advise a crisis application taking the equations and methods I 
developed straight out of the paper and attempting to apply it directly to existing 
applications, I believe this is proof enough of concept that organizations using social media 
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data should develop comparative baseline models. By this I mean that areas with 
substantial amounts of social media in a non-crisis state that go silent should be 
investigated during a crisis instead of ignored, or considered areas in which the humans-
as-sensors network is down, so to speak. Many of the crisis map applications currently 
have multiple different views and data layers than can be viewed by emergency managers 
(Chen et al. 2016; Imran et al. 2014); I believe this research is a strong argument for 
including “deviation from reference state” as one of the layers. Additionally, I believe the 
data show a trend of increasing amounts and significance of social media silence in cities 
which experienced greater amounts of hurricane damage. If social media silence becomes 
more significant with increasing hurricane damage, and if hurricane damage is expected to 
increase (Gall et al. 2011), then this implies an increasing need to consider the impacts of 
the silence I identified.  
Through this research, I have identified two main promising future research paths. 
The first is to better understand when and how social media silence can best be an indicator 
of a crisis event. This research provides proof of concept and theory, but it does not provide 
a directly translatable method of identifying crises through social media silence. The 
second is understanding, a-priori, what factors influence the prevalence of silence in some 
areas versus excited bursts of Twitter activity in others. Which of the drop-offs are due to 
failures in urban resilience, and which are due solely to intentional human behavioral 
choices? Interrupted network access could have been caused by power outages, a lack of 
access through a paid mobile network, or through lack of access to external networks. Part 
of the socioeconomic facet of that question was explored in Chapter 4, but there are still 
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many aspects of socioeconomic vulnerability as it relates to crisis informatics that have not 
been explored. 
This research paper contributes the confirmation that social media data shadows 
during a crisis are necessary components to consider in crisis management strategies, and 
that sudden and severe decreases in social media silence are more likely to indicate danger 
than not. Ultimately, to use humans-as-sensors data in the most equitable and actionable 
way, crisis researchers need to listen for both the sound and the silence of the Tweets. 
5.2 Tipping the Scales 
Following the identification of social media silence as a likely indicator of a local 
hazard, I began investigating why absences of data have been understudied and unutilized. 
The point of departure for Silence of the Tweets was the Shelton et al. paper, so I continued 
to review both his lab’s papers and other social media studies in the field of critical GIS. I 
encountered a decades-old problem in GIS called the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem 
(MAUP), which is essentially an aspect of Simpson’s paradox when studying geographic 
information (Wagner 1982). Averaging across two groups—or aggregating across large 
areas—can create a trend that is the opposite of what the trend is when the groups are 
considered in isolate (Jelinski and Wu 1996; Nelson and Brewer 2017). I theorized that the 
spots of social media silence that I had observed in my first study had been diluted by 
differences in scalar aggregation in other studies.  
Part of this theory was founded in the previously-recognized disparity in urban and 
rural social media informatics (Hecht and Stephens 2014; Johnson et al. 2017). Most social 
media studies operate using social boundaries, which are often delineated by population 
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sizes or political boundaries. When using either census tracts or ZCTAs, there is less 
aggregation at the population-dense centers of cities and more aggregation towards the 
larger rural tracts on the peripheries. Additionally, the field of critical GIS strongly 
recommends place-based algorithms and analyses that incorporate community history 
(Thatcher et al. 2015). Previous research had identified differences in social media 
correlation with crisis events at the census tract and county scale (Kryvasheyeu et al. 2016), 
and further research had theorized that larger areas of analysis would have a stronger 
connection between social media data and crisis events (Chen et al. 2013). However, the 
actual relationship between analytical scale and social media analyses had not been 
defined, and the consequences of using non-uniform scales had not been explained in the 
context of either information availability or crisis detection. 
I modified the spatial association of scalable hexagons (SASH) technique 
developed originally for the field of landscape ecology to assess the effect of scale on 
various metrics used in the field of crisis informatics to identify crises. These were: bursts 
of extreme Twitter activity, sudden Twitter activity silence, the correlation between Twitter 
activity and infrastructure damage, and the geographic area with statistically sufficient 
quantities of Twitter data for analysis. I identified several potential power law relationships 
between these factors that are critical to current crisis-identification methods and rapid 
damage-assessment metrics. In doing so, I contribute several undiscussed tradeoffs 
between scale and the value of social media data. Decreasing scale improves location 
specificity and reduces the influence of the MAUP; however, decreasing scale also reduces 
the statistical robustness of data contextualization, increases the percentage of areas 
exhibiting extreme social media behaviors, and, perhaps most importantly, exponentially 
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decreases the correlation between social media activity and damage. The results show that 
the negative influence of these tradeoffs is minimized between 5-15 km2. 
In terms of research applications utilized by emergency managers, again, I cannot 
immediately recommend that all research applications employ 5 km2 hexagons to aggregate 
Twitter data. Part of this is the relative inaccuracy of disaggregated population at larger 
scales; the other part is that scale likely has different effects on different forms of crises, 
just as “silence” did. That said, this technique could be pulled directly from this research 
to produce the reference state discussed in 5.1. Additionally, in the context of crisis 
applications, running either spatial clustering or spatiotemporal aggregation analyses at 
multiple different scales is necessary for full data contextualization. Beyond that, I believe 
further research is necessary to carefully delineate the conclusions that can be drawn from 
social media analyses at the local scale and at the broader scales of a major disaster. For 
emergency managers, knowing the location, magnitude, and severity of a crisis is 
paramount. Within this research, I show that how location and magnitude are defined in 
our algorithms strongly influences the severity determined through social media. 
Additionally, this influence is likely further disadvantaging rural and vulnerable 
populations in existing methodology. With our sights set on more equitable and actionable 
analyses, we must further incorporate geographic scale into how we interpret social media 
activity. 
5.3 Deepening the Divide 
Finally, I began to explore in more depth my theory that socioeconomic 
vulnerabilities were a driving factor in the presence and importance of social media silence. 
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If this were the case, usage of social media data without contextualization would prioritize 
resource distribution to the least vulnerable instead of the most. I additionally wanted to 
test whether a decrease in social media presence in areas with more vulnerable populations 
could be predicted from the pre-crisis period. Recent research into vulnerable populations 
has shown that the poorest populations—and poorest countries—are going to be hit first 
and hardest by the effects of climate change (Schiermeier 2018). Thus, the way we process 
information needs to be more than peripherally aware of the differences in digital 
capabilities. Previous research had noted the existence of the “digital divide” in the context 
of social media during crises: vulnerable populations contribute comparatively less to 
social media streams than less vulnerable populations during a disaster (Zou et al. 2018). 
Considering my position arguing for cities to develop reference social media states to 
which disaster data could be compared, I wanted to understand whether or not the relatively 
smaller contribution of vulnerable populations during a disaster could be identified in a 
steady state. If it could, then the digital divide noted by Zou et al. would not be disaster-
specific, and the reference state could utilized as a yardstick by which to measure the 
impact of the crisis on vulnerable populations. If there were a greater disparity between the 
data observed in vulnerable populations and non-vulnerable populations in a disaster state 
than a normal state, however, that would be ample evidence of a crisis-specific 
phenomenon that directly and specifically affects vulnerable populations’ contribution to 
the social media data stream. 
The major contribution of this paper is evidence that there is something 
fundamentally different in how vulnerable populations are able to—or want to—use social 
media during a crisis as opposed to a steady state period. I show that vulnerability factors 
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have a significant negative influence on social media activity during a hurricane but not 
during the steady state. This indicates that vulnerable populations decrease their social 
media usage during a hurricane in a way that less vulnerable populations do not, and that 
the presence or absence of social media during a steady state cannot quantify the impact a 
crisis will have on their social media usage. As the crisis informatics community continues 
to evolve, and as emergency responders are increasingly monitoring social media during a 
crisis (Murthy and Gross 2017), this consideration of how well the existing data represents 
different populations will be critical to equity. Areas with higher vulnerability scores have 
already been shown to be more poorly served by existing emergency response services like 
hurricane evacuation (Bian and Wilmot 2017); it would be a vast disservice to these 
populations by continuing this trend in services distributed due to needs identified through 
social media analyses. 
In terms of future work, previous research into the distribution of vulnerability as 
it relates to infrastructure, hazard impact, and demographic factors notes that the 
vulnerability of U.S. cities to hazards, and the resulting variation in recovery time, is highly 
city-dependent (Borden et al. 2007). The presence or absence of this phenomenon, in more 
and less vulnerable cities, should be explored. The city-specific context of crisis 
information and vulnerable populations also informs the potential for a wide variety of 
influences on the quantity of available information. As it stands, this research is unable to 
isolate the causes, social or technical, of the differences in social media interaction within 
in vulnerable populations. Because of that, the influence of city-wide infrastructure damage 
and service disruption, especially as related to power and telecommunication coverage, 
should be explored. Understanding what factors are lessening vulnerable populations’ 
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social media involvement will be integral for crisis communication through social media 
as well (Fan et al. 2019; Lachlan et al. 2016; Olteanu et al. 2015). 
For crisis researchers and emergency managers, this complicates how crisis 
informatics should prioritize social media information. Balancing the usage of new and 
important forms of information with which populations are most aided by that information 
is going to be one of the principal ethical questions concerning the pursuit of the smarter, 
more resilient city. As urban analytics and decision-makers begin to utilize more big data 
produced by the interactions between people and technology, delineating why a crisis-
specific discrepancy in social media data exists will be critical for equitable data 
stewardship. This could be done through a-priori recognition of areas with high degrees of 
social vulnerability or through continued assessment of the factors that might be causing 
the targeted decreases in social media activity from vulnerable populations. Ultimately, 
emergency responders seeking to use social media data (and any form of humans-as-
sensors data) need to incorporate the in-crisis discrepancies between data produced by 
general and vulnerable populations. In so doing, we can begin the process of bridging these 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
Social media data is a growing, constantly-evolving source of community-based 
information that has strong potential for use in emergency management. As urban 
development increases in coastal regions and as climate change increases disaster-risk in 
those regions, improving the quantity and quality of the data available for crisis response 
is becoming more important. However, even as crisis management applications using 
social media data continue to proliferate, it is equally important for us to consider the 
boundaries of who social media data is capable of representing during a crisis. Within the 
research presented in this dissertation, I show that areas where there has been a sharp 
decrease in Twitter activity are more likely to have larger amounts of infrastructural 
damage than less; that the geographic boundaries of existing analyses can strongly 
influence the conclusions of those analyses in ways detrimental to people in less-populated 
areas; and that crises inhibit vulnerable populations’ interactions with social media beyond 
the limitations faced by those populations during normal periods. These studies incorporate 
methodologies from critical GIS, emergency management, spatial analytics, and 
information management to produce both warnings and suggestions for utilizing non-
traditional forms of crisis information. As citizens increase their contributions to social 
media data, and as emergency managers look more and more towards using it, 
understanding how social media data can be equitably and actionably deployed is a 
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